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Abstract
In this cand.scient. thesis we propose a strategy for testing validity of decom-
position of contract oriented specifications. The strategy is based on Abadi
and Lamport’s Composition Theorem for the Temporal Logic of Actions and
test case generation from executable specifications.
A composition rule, inspired by the Compositon Theorem, is formulated
in a semantics based on timed streams. A subset of the Specification and
Decription Language (SDL) is defined and the SDL subset is formalized in
the semantics.
A simplification of the testing strategy was realized in an experimental
prototype tool for testing of contract decompositions in SDL. In addition an-
other prototype tool based on a conventional strategy was built as a reference
tool.
Testing of the two tools showed that both validated valid contract decom-
positions and falsified invalid contract decompositions. Testing also showed
that the tool based on the composition rule in some interesting situations was
considerably more efficient than the tool based on the conventional strategy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this cand.scient.1 thesis we develop a strategy for testing the validity of
decomposition of contract oriented specifications. The strategy is inspired
by Abadi and Lamport’s Composition Theorem [Abadi and Lamport, 1995],
and is in this thesis refered to as the Abadi/Lamport testing method.
A conventional strategy for testing of contract decomposition, which we
refer to as the Direct testing method, is also described.
Both testing methods are formalized the stream-based semantics of the
the Focus method [Broy and Stølen, 2001], and are based on principles from
functional testing.
We explain how both testing methods were simulated with the Descrip-
tion and Specification Language (SDL) [ITU-T, 2000b] and the commercial
tool Telelogic Tau SDL Suite [Telelogic, 2001]. Emperical testing was con-
ducted in order to validate the correctness of the Abadi/Lamport testing
method and in order to compare the two testing strategies.
Section 1.1 gives motivation for this work and section 1.2 offers an over-
view of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Today’s computerized systems tend to be large and complex. They are often
distributed, which means different parts of the system process in parallel,
and open in the sense that they run in environments which potentially can
give the systems any input. While computerized systems become a more
integrated part of infrastructure and society, there is also an increasing need
1Cand.scient. is short for candidatus scientarum, a degree comparable to Master of
Science.
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for ensuring the reliability of such systems. Cost and effectiveness in a de-
velopment process are not insignificant.
We believe that a computerized tool based on the Abadi/Lamport testing
method could ease the development and maintenance of distributed systems,
make the systems more reliable and make the development more efficient.
1.1.1 Decomposition
All distributed systems consist of several components. A well known ap-
proach to specification of component based systems is to start with a specific-
ation of the system as a whole and then identify and specify the components
of the system. This decomposition can be done in several iteration, so that
a specified component of the system is decomposed into sub-components.
This is not a new principle. In 1966 Börje Langefors proposed the funda-
mental principle of systems work2:
“Partition the system works into seperate tasks, a through d,
a. Definition of the system as a set of parts.
List all parts from which the system is regarded as built-up.
b. Definition of system structure.
Define all interconnections which make up the system by
joining its parts together.
c. Definition of the system parts.
For each singel part (or group of similare parts) seperately
define its properties as required by the system work at hand
and do this in a format as specified by the way the systems
structure is defined (in task b).
d. Determination of the properties of the system.
Use the definitions as produced by the tasks a, b, and all
seperate tasks c, all taken together. Compare with specific-
ations wanted for the system and repeat a, b, c, and d until
satisfied.”3
With this approach to system development there is a need for methods for
validating that a composition of specified components refines a higher level
2We understand systems work as Langefors’ expression for what we call system devel-
opment.
3The quote is from [Langefors, 1973], but the fist edition from 1966 also contains the
fundamental principle
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specification. We refer to this as validation of decomposition. In the devel-
opment of distributed systems such methods for validation must be able to
handle concurrancy.
Our work is inspired by Abadi and Lamport’s Composition Theorem. The
Composition Theorem is used for performing this validation by the means of
logical proofs, and can be said to belong to the field of formal methods.
1.1.2 Formal Methods
Formal methods can be seen as a branch of theoretical computer science
where the objectives are to formalize, and make abstract models for reason-
ing about, matters such as computer programs, programming languages and
system development techniques.
The history of theoretical computer science can be traced back to at
least the 1930s. Lambda-calculus orignates from a paper by Alonzo Church
published in 1933 [Church, 1933] and in 1936 Alan M. Turing published his
first paper on what was later called Turing-machines [Turing, 1936]. Both
lambda-calculus and Turing-machines can be seen as mathematical models
of computation, which at the time was performed by humans and mechanical
devices. In the 1960s groups of computer scientists began formulating models,
based on mathematics and logic, for reasoning about computer programs and
programming languages. Most famous is probably the Hoare-logic [Hoare,
1969] (see section 2.3.1). In the 1970s systems with parallelism came in focus
[Jones, 1992], and in the 1980s and -90s a considerably amount of research
in this field has been on such systems. Approaches refered to in this thesis
are [Jones, 1981], [Misra and Chandy, 1981], [Lamport and Schneider, 1984],
[Hoare, 1985], [Abadi and Lamport, 1990], [Abadi and Lamport, 1995], [Cau
and Collette, 1996], [Stølen, 1996] and [Broy and Stølen, 2001].
Most of the work within formal methods has been formalization, but
there have also been made attempts to apply formal methods directly in
system development. There are however few examples of this being successful
[Finney and Fenton, 1996, Fenton and Pfleeger, 1997]. Some of the reason
may be that formal techniques are tedious and time-consuming, and people
without thorough training often find them hard to understand [Finney, 1996].
As a result, formal methods are little used in real-life system development,
especially in development of commercial software [Finney and Fenton, 1996].
As we explain in chapter 3, we still believe that the results from formal
methods could be useful in system development. Our work is based on two
prinsiples from formal methods; contract oriented specification and the com-
position principle.
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1.1.3 Contract Oriented Specifications
Contract orientated specifications orginate from [Jones, 1981] and [Misra and
Chandy, 1981]. As indicated by the name, contract oriented specifications
are specifications formed as contracts. The contract oriented specification
of a component consists of an assumption and a guarantee. The contractual
relationship is that the component should behave as specified in the guarantee
as long as the environment of the component behave as specified in the
assumption.
Contract oriented specifications evidently have some advantages. With
this specification format we are able to distinguish, in a logical way, the func-
tionality of a component from the conditions that must be fulfilled for the
component to work. A perhaps more importent advantage is that we get
a specification format which emphasize what is demanded from the envir-
onment of a specified component. We can decrease the chance of unpleas-
ant surprises when integrating components because the requirements on the
context of the components are explicitly specified. We believe for example
outsourcing of implementation, use of standard components and re-use of
components could be made easier with contract oriented specifications.
Contract oriented specifications are presented in more detail in section
2.3.
1.1.4 The Composition Principle
Abadi and Lamport’s Composition Theorem is a rule for validating decom-
position of contract oriented specifications by logical proofs, and may in
certain respects be seen as a generalization of similar rules in [Jones, 1981]
and [Misra and Chandy, 1981]. We believe the Composition Theorem can be
generalized to a universal principle for validation of contract decomposition.
We refere to this principle as the composition principle. Results from [Cau
and Collette, 1996], which show that the principle is language independent,
support this belief. In this respect, both the Composition Theorem and the
composition rule we propose in chapter 6 are instances of the composition
principle. Other instances of the principle can be found in [Abadi and Lam-
port, 1990] and [Stølen, 1996].
1.1.5 Functional Testing at Specification Level
Development of distributed computerized system will often include large
groups of people. Different parts of a system are developed by different
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persons, and the development process involve persons that not are experts
on system development.
Methodologies for system development must be able to handle this. We
believe that good methods for specification, and validation at specification
level, are essential parts of such methodologies. It is not uncommon practice
to do testing of integration after the components are implemented. If it then
should become evident that the components are not able to communicate or
that the integration does not give the expected result, it may be necessary
to make changes in the implementation or even make new implementations
of some of the componenets. If testing of integration is done at specification
level, the risk for implementing components that cannot be integrated is
reduced.
Validation is usually done by automated or manual testing, but testing
techniques are often informal or semi-formal and much of the testing usually
occur at the end of a system development process. We believe that both
integration testing during the specification phase of a system development
process and testing techniques with a formal fundament can make system
development more efficient and make systems more reliable.
1.1.6 Graphical Specification Techniques
The last decade graphical, diagram based specification languages have been
dominating the system development industry. Experience have proved that
these specification languages are useful, especially because they are easy to
learn and understand. Because of this we focus on graphical specification
techniques.
As specification language in our work we use the Specification and De-
scription Language (SDL), which is a graphical specification language based
on state transition diagrams and dataflow diagrams.
 SDL process diagrams (state trancition diagrams) are used for specifiy-
ing behavior.
 SDL block diagrams (dataflow diagrams) are used for specifying static
communication structure.
We decided to use SDL because
 SDL is a well known and widly used specification language;
 SDL has a graphical, diagram based representation;
 SDL specifications are executable and can therefore be used for gener-
ating and executing tests;
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 SDL has sufficient tool support for the tasks we carried out in our work.
Although we use SDL to test our hypotheses, our results should carry
over to the class of executable specifications.
1.1.7 Emperical Testing
The validity of the proposed testing strategy cannot be established without
emperical testing. It is possible to make mathematical arguments concern-
ing correctness and consistency of the semantics, but this does prove that
the strategy, as a system development technique, yields correct results. Se-
mantics are abstractions of reality. The only way of showing that abstract
principles are valid in practice is by application. The need for experiments
and emperical evaluation when introducing new principles and techniques to
system development is discussed in [Tichy, 1998] and [Zelkowitz and Wallace,
1998].
A full validation based on emperical testing is theoretical impossible, but
after conducting successful experiments on the strategy, there are reasons to
be more confident in its validity. Furthermore we have no other method for
measuring efficiency, which is a common requirement of system development
techniques.
We are also of the opinion that purly theoretical reflections are of little
value if we are not able to relate them to practical system development.
In [Tichy et al., 1995] and [Zelkowitz andWallace, 1998] results are presen-
ted that show a considerably lack of experimentation and emperical testing
in computer science compared to other sciences. Another motivation for con-
ducting emperical tests is to contribute to a development in computer science
towards a broader use of scientific methods.
1.2 Overview
When this thesis was written, we had tree goals conserning the structure:
1. It should be possible to read the thesis from beginning to end.
2. The chapters represent a logical partition of the work conducted.
3. Each of the chapters should be able to stand alone, to a degree as high
as possible.
The two first goals we think we have managed fairly well. The last goal is
not reached to the degree we wanted. The result is quite an amount of cross
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references. We hope this not confuses the reader, but makes the thesis more
readable.
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
 Chapter 2 provides background on the techniques and theories this
work is based on.
 Chapter 3 provides a thorough analysis of the hypotheses of this work
and an overview of the tasks executed in the investigation into these
hypotheses.
 Chapter 4 provides the definition of a SDL subset, general semantics
and a formalization of the SDL subset.
 Chapter 5 provides formalization of contract oriented specifications and
a scheme for specifying contracts in SDL.
 Chapter 6 contains the composition rule, a corollary and a proof of the
composition rule.
 Chapter 7 explains how we built two experimental prototype tools for
testing of contract decompositions of SDL specifications; one based on
direct testing and one based on the composition rule.
 Chapter 8 describes the tests conducted with the prototype tools and
discusses the results of these tests.
 Chapter 9 provides a discussion of possible generalizations of the work
presented in this thesis.
In addition there are tree appendices.
 Appendix A contains the code of the testing tools.
 Appendix B contains a full test example.
 Appendix C contains raw test results form testing of the tools.
Figure 1.1 provides a “dependency graph” of the main sections in this thesis,
which we hope clearify the structure.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides some background on the techniques and theories that
the work of this thesis is based on. Section 2.1 provieds background on the
Specification and Description Language and section 2.2 gives provides some
background on the Focus method. In section 2.3 there is a presentation of
contract oriented specifications, and in section 2.4 the composition principle
is presented. Finally section 2.5 provides background on testing.
2.1 Specification and Description Language
The Specification and Description Language (SDL) [ITU-T, 2000b] is a stand-
ard of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and widely used
as specification language in the telecommunication industry. SDL was first
standardized by ITU in 1992, based on an earlier definition of the language.
This standard is usually refered to as SDL-92. In 1996 minor changes to
SDL-92 was made, and the result is often refered to as SDL-96. In 2000 ITU
made a new standard for SDL, which is called SDL-2000. This work is based
on SDL-92, but all features of SDL we use are also features of SDL-96 and
SDL-2000.
SDL specifications have three main building blocks:
 SDL system;
 SDL block;
 SDL process.
An SDL system is specfied by a block interaction diagram, an SDL block
is specified by a block interaction digram or a process interaction diagram
and an SDL process is specified by a process diagrams. Block interaction
9
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SYSTEM sys
ASIGNAL in,out1,out2;
SIGNALLIST out=out1,out2;
BLOCK blk ASIGNAL int;
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o
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Figure 2.1: SDL block and process interaction diagrams
diagrams and process interaction diagrams are special kinds of dataflow dia-
gram which shows repectively SDL blocks or SDL processes interconnected
with channels1. The boundary of an SDL system represents the environment
of the specified system. A point where a channel meets the boundary of a
block is called a gate.
Process diagrams are a kind of state transition diagrams. These state
transition diagrams are also called extended finite state machines; state ma-
chines with a finite number of states and extended with features like variables
and timers.
Processes and blocks in an SDL system are assumed to run in parallel.
Block and process interaction diagrams specify the static structure of the
specified system, while the behavior is specified by process diagrams. Figures
2.1 and 2.2 show a small example SDL specification.
(It is also possible to specify processes as sevice interaction diagrams,
where the services are specified by state transition diagrams. Further it
is possible to specify block and process types which can have one or more
instances, and procedures and functions. We do however not make use of
these features.)
1In SDL-92 there is a distinction between channels and signal routes. In this thesis we
do not distinguish between channels and signal routes, and refer to both as channels.
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Figure 2.2: SDL state transition diagrams
2.2 Focus
The Focus method [Broy and Stølen, 2001] is a collection of system specific-
ation and description techniques, formalized in a stream-based semantics.
Streams of messages represent communication histories, where the streams
are infinite long and time dependent. Time is represented by time ticks in
the streams, where each tick represtents the end of a time unit. In this
semantics, behavior of systems and components are characterized by the re-
lation between their input and output streams.
There are two specification techniques in Focus that are of special in-
terest in our work; dataflow diagrams and stream processing functions.
Dataflow diagrams is a graphical technique for specifying compositions
and communication structures of systems. Focus dataflow diagrams consist
of components, drawn as boxes, and directed channels, drawn as arrows.
Streams may be seen as recordings of the communications over channels.
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Stream processing functions is a technique for specifying behavior of com-
ponents in an algorithmic fashion that is easy to relate to state transition
diagrams. A component is specified by a set of mutual recursive functions.
The functions are defined by a where-so that clause and a set of equations
on the functions; the functions are defined to be the functions that fulfil the
conjunction of the equations.
These specifications are on the form
o = f0(i) where f0; f1; : : : ; fn−1 so that 8i; o :
e1
^ e2
...
^ em
where i and o are tuples of input and output streams, f0; f1; : : : ; fn−1 are the
functions and e1; e2; : : : ; em are the equation. The types of the functions and
the streams are omitted, since they will follow from the context where this
specification format is used.
2.3 Contract Oriented Specifications
The paradigm of contract oriented specifications2 has its origin in the field
of formal methods as a way of specifying components of component based
systems with concurrency. The first explisit use of contracts are found in
[Jones, 1981] and [Misra and Chandy, 1981], but in e.g. [Hoare, 1969] a kind
of contracts is proposed. The paradigm is motivated by the fact that a system
component usually will be specified for working inside a given context. This
context – the component’s environment – consists of other componenets of
the system and possibly the external environment of the system. When
specifying a component it is reasonable to make certain assumptions on the
context in which the component will be working.
In the contract oriented paradigm, systems and system componets are
specified by an assumption and a guarantee. The assumption describes the
conditions under which a component is meant to run and the guarantee
specify the requirements the component should fulfil when executed under
the assumed conditions.
There exists various specification techniques and methods for validation
within this paradigm. The contract oriented specifications in this thesis are
2Contract oriented specifications are also called assumption/guarantee, assumption/-
commitment and rely/guarantee specifications. We also use the expressions contract spe-
cifications and contracts in this thesis.
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inspired by the assumption/guaratee specifications for the Temporal Logic of
Actions (TLA) in [Abadi and Lamport, 1995], the assumption/commitment
specifications in [Stølen, 1996] and the assumption/guarantee style of spe-
cifications in the Focus method [Broy and Stølen, 2001]. Each of these
techniques can be placed in one of two groups: state-based formalisms and
stream-based formalisms.
2.3.1 Contracts in State-Based Formalisms
In state-based formalisms, behavior of systems and components are charac-
terized by sequences of states. A state in this respect is seen as a tuple of
values.
Hoare-Logic
An early and well-known state-based formalism that uses a kind of contracts
is the Hoare-logic for program specification and verification [Hoare, 1969],
with its pre-conditions and post-conditions. In Hoare-logic a program is
specified by the triplet
fPgSfQg
where S is a program and P and Q are predicates that specify program
states3. The tiplet assert that if the pre-condition P is true when S is ini-
tialized, we require that the post-condition Q is true when S terminates, i.e.,
S must fulfil Q if the assumed program state P is true when the execution
of S starts.
Temporal Logic of Actions
The Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [Lamport, 1994, Abadi and Lamport,
1995] is a specification language where systems are specified by logical for-
mulas. Its semantics are state-based, and TLA can be seen as predicate-logic
extended with actions that contain a temporal element.
In TLA the behavior of a system is viewed as an infinite sequence of states,
where the states are assignments of values to variables. While a predicate
concerns the properties of one state and is true or false for that state, an
action is a relation between two consecutive states and is true for a pair of
states if the action is able to bring the system from the first state to the
other, and false otherwise.
3Hoare uses the notation PfSgQ.
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TLA specifications have the form
M =
def 9x : Init ^[N ]v ^ L
and are either true or false for a behavior. A behavior  is said to satisfy
M iff M is true for . This is denoted by  j= F . F is valid iff F is satisfied
by all possible behaviors. This is denoted j= F .
Init^[N ]v specify the safety properties and L the liveness properties of
M . Init is a predicate that must be true for the first state of the behavior,
i.e., the initial conditions. N is an action and  is the temporal operator
always, so N is true if N is true for every pair of consecutive states. v is
a tuple with the variables in the formula, and [N ]v means we allow steps
that leave v unchanged. 9x : F means that there exists a sequence of values
for x that satisfies F . 9 is used to hide internal variables of a specification.
Contract specifications in TLA are specified with a special symbol −+.. A
contract is specified by
E−+.M
where E and M are TLA formulas representing respectively the assumption
and the guarantee of the specified system or component.
E−+.M means that M is true at least one step longer than E if E ever
becomes false. If jn denotes  truncated after the n first states, the precise
definition is that  satisfies E−+.M iff  satisfies E ) M and for every n 2 N,
if E is true for jn then M is true for jn+1.
2.3.2 Contracts in Steam-Based Formalisms
Examples of contract oriented specifications in stream-based formalisms can
be found in e.g. [Broy and Stølen, 2001] and [Stølen, 1996], both based on
the semantics of the Focus method.
In [Broy and Stølen, 2001] contract oriented specification is defined by
8j 2 N : A#j) G#i:j#o:j+1
A) G
where the assumption A and guarantee G are predicates over timed streams.
A#j denotes A where the streams are truncated after time j, and G#i:j#o:j+1
denotes G where the tuple of input streams i is truncated after time j and
the tuple of output streams o are truncated after time j + 1.
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In [Stølen, 1996] contract oriented specifications are defined by the means
of guarded (strongly causal) functions on tuples of streams. A function  is
guared iff
i#j= s#j) (i)#j+1= (s)#j+1
where i and s are streams and #j denotes truncations of streams after time
j. The definition of a contract oriented specification is
f j8i; j : hAi(i#j+1; (i)#j)) hGi(i#j+1; (i)#j+1)g
where all functions  are guared and hP i denotes the prefix closure of P .
2.4 The Composition Principle
Abadi and Lamport’s Composition Theorem is probably the best known
instance of the composition principle. In [Abadi and Lamport, 1995] the
Composition Theorem is formulated as
If, for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n,
j= C(E) ^
n^
j=1
C(Mj)) Ei
and
j= C(E)+v ^
n^
j=1
C(Mj)) C(M)
j= E ^
n^
j=1
Mj )M
then
j=
n^
j=1
(Ej−+.Mj)) (E−+.M)
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E+v means that the vector v of free variables will stop changing if E ever
becomes false. The precise definition is that  satisfies E+v iff  satisfies E
or there is an n such that E is true for jn and  never changes after the
n+ 1 first states.
C(M) denotes the closure of a TLA formula M . C(M) is satisfied by
a behavior  iff every prefix of  satisfies M , i.e., C(M) specifiy the prefix
closure of the set of behaviors specified byM . C(M) can be seen as extracting
the safety properties of M .
Other instances of the composition principle are formulated in [Abadi and
Lamport, 1990], [Cau and Collette, 1996] and [Stølen, 1996].
2.5 Testing
There exists a variety of techniques for testing of systems that can be spe-
cified by finite state machines and extended and communicating finite state
machines [Lee and Yannakakis, 1996].
In the work of this thesis we make use of established techniques for gen-
erating and executing test cases. We do testing of the external behavior of
systems, and do therefore not consider e.g. techniques for identification of
system states.
This approach we refer to as functional testing. In [Beizer, 1984] we find
the following definition:
“In functional testing the element is treated as a black box. It is
subjected to inputs and its outcomes are verified for conformance
to its specification.”
We find this definition suitable for our approach. However note that also
“the elements” under test will be specifications in our testing strategy.
The testing technique relevant in this thesis is a technique usually refered
to as state space exploration. A state space exploration of an extended finite
state machine builds a reachability graph from the machine, where the nodes
are called configurations. Each configuration is a combination of a control
state and assignment of values to the variables in the state machine. In order
to avoid state explosion, equivalent configurations are collapsed into single
nodes. Test cases can be extracted from the reachability graph, and test
cases can be verified by searching the reachability graph for matching paths.
A general discussion on state space explorations is found in [Lee and
Yannakakis, 1996], and the concrete state space algorithms used by the tool
used in our work are described in [Ek, 1993] and [Koch et al., 1998]
Chapter 3
Problem Analysis
In this chapter we describe and analyse the main hypotheses on which this
work is based. We also describe how these hypotheses are investigated. Sec-
tion 3.1 describes the main hypotheses. Section 3.2 characterizes the prob-
lems we face in the investigation of these hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes
the concrete strategy used in the investigation and section 3.4 provides the
success criteria we have defined for the results.
3.1 Main Hypoheses
There are two concrete hypotheses on which this work is based. Both are in-
stances of an underlying hypothesis on system development. This underlying
hypothesis we call The existence of universal principles for system develop-
ment, and is not investigated directly. The two concrete hypotheses of this
report we refer to as Application of functional testing on contract specifica-
tions and Application of the composition principle in functional testing. In
this section both the underlying and concrete hypoteses are motivated and
formulated.
3.1.1 The Existence of Universal Principles for System
Development
In section 1.1.2 we claim that formal methods, despite of a relatively long
history, has no large place in real-life system development. We are of the
opinion that this does not make the principles from this field less valid in
themselves; it only shows that the way these principles have been applied
in system development has not been very fruitful. On this background we
formulate the underlying hypothesis:
17
18 Problem Analysis
The field of theoretical computer science provides a number of
theories and abstract principles about computer science and sys-
tem development. These theories may be unified into univeral
principles that are valid for system development in general. It
should be possible to transform these principles into practical
system development methods and tools that
 will improve the efficiency of system development;
 will improve the quality of the resulting systems;
 will simplify management and maintance of systems;
 does not require particulare training or understanding of the
underlying logic and mathematics.
As indicated there is a requirement that system deveolpment methods and
tools built in accordance to the universal principles must hide the underlying
logic and mathematics. A method based on an abstract principle should
be usable also without special competence in the logic and mathematics in
which the abstract principle is formulated.
The existence of such universal principles is supported by, e.g. [Cau
and Collette, 1996] where it is shown that the composition principle is lan-
guage independent and [Lamport and Schneider, 1984] which demonstrates
the broad applicability of formal principles for program verification.
3.1.2 Application of Functional Testing on Contract Spe-
cifications
As indicated in the presentation of contract oriented specifications in sections
1.1.3 and 2.3, we believe that this is a useful specification technique. Contract
specifications have been used in formal techniques for validating properties
of specifications. Our opinion is that the paradigm of contracts is general
enough to be applied in functional testing. The hypothesis is formulated:
It is possible to construct a general method for functional testing
of the decomposition of concurrent systems described by contract
oriented specifications with executable assumptions and guaran-
tees. The method can be realized in a computerized tool.
3.2 Characterization of the Problem 19
3.1.3 Application of the Composition Principle in Func-
tional Testing
In section 1.1.4 we describe how the composition principle has been used
for proving validity of contract decompositions by means of logical proofs.
We believe that the composition principle is a universal principle, so if there
is a way of relating functional testing to contract specifications, it is pos-
sible to also apply the composition principle to functional testing of contract
decompositions. Hence our hypothesis is:
It is possible to apply the composition principle to contract ori-
ented specification made for functional testing and make a gen-
eral method for functional testing of decomposition of concurrent
systems, which will be more efficient than merely direct testing.
3.2 Characterization of the Problem
The main objective of this cand.scient. thesis is to investigate the hypotheses
in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. We do not try to verify or argue for the underlying
hypothesis presented in section 3.1.1 beyond this.
In order to do this investigation the work was divied into the following
tasks:
 Define a general semantics for specifications.
 Define a suitable subset of SDL and adapt the semantics to this subset.
 Define contract specifications for the semantics and relate them to SDL.
 Formulate a composition rule for the semantics and relate it to SDL.
 Implement prototypes for simulation of two computerized tools for test-
ing of contact decompositions in SDL:
– Direct testing tool, based on a conventional strategy;
– Abadi/Lamport testing tool, based on the composition rule;
and performing emperical testing of contract decompositions with these
prototype tools.
Below these tasks are described in more detail.
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3.2.1 Specification Language
Even though we want to develop a general method, it is useful to relate the
method to a specification language/technique to better show how the method
is supposed to work. It is also necessary to concretize if we are to actually
try out the method.
As specification language we use a subset of the Specification and De-
scription Language (SDL) [ITU-T, 2000b]. Our main requirement is that
the specification language is executable. SDL specifications are executable
and there exists commercial tools that simulate SDL specifications. In addi-
tion SDL has a graphical, diagram based representation.
In SDL, state transition diagrams (state machines) are used to specify
behavior, while dataflow diagrams are used to specify the static structures of
systems. In order to keep the work within the scope of what can be expected
from a cand.scient. thesis, we do not include features like abstract datatypes,
composite states, instancation and inheritance. The SDL subset is defined
in section 4.1.
3.2.2 Semantics
If we are to reason formally about specifications, there is a need for underlying
formal semantics. There are several requirements that such semantics should
fulfil:
 it must be able to handle concurrency and composition;
 it need a way of representing contract oriented specifications;
 there must be a way of relating it to functional testing;
 it must be possible to adapt it to different specification languages.
We define a stream based semantics based on the Focus method. This
semantics should fulfil the requirements listed above. We also use stream
processing functions from Focus to make a link between the stream based
semantics and SDL.
Executable specifications are able to express arbitrary computational
safety properties, but not arbitrary liveness properties (see section 4.2.6).
The choice of specification language thereby reduces the set of properties we
are able to specifiy.
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3.2.3 Adaption of Composition Principle
Part of the goal is to use the composition principle in a testing strategy.
To be able to do this we formulate a composition rule in our semantics,
inspired by Abadi and Lamport’s Composition Theorem. Since we have a
formal semantics we are able to do formal reasoning about it, and a proof
of soundness of the composition rule is included. The same restictions as we
have imposed on the specification language will apply to our instance of the
composition principle.
3.2.4 Testing Tools
Part of the hypotheses is that the proposed testing strategy can be realized
as a computerized tool for automated testing. To validate this we need to
do empirical testing, which means the proposed tool should be realized and
tried out.
A full implementation is not possible within the scope of an cand.scient.
thesis. Instead we build two prototype tools by using functionality in SDL
Validator, a part of Telelogic Tau SDL Suite [Telelogic, 2001], and small pro-
grams written in the programming language Perl [Schwartz and Christiansen,
1997] to handle SDL Validator and generated test cases:
 Direct testing tool;
 Abadi/Lamport testing tool.
The first tool tests contract decompositions in SDL directly and the second
does the testing according to the composition rule. These prototype tools
must be seen as experimental, i.e., we build them only in order to conduct
experiments on the testing strategies.
Both tools validate the concrete hypothesis of section 3.1.2, while the
Abadi/Lamport testing tool validates the first part of the hypothesis of sec-
tion 3.1.3. If the hypothesis of section 3.1.3 is valid it seems reasonable to
expect that the Abadi/Lamport testing tool is more efficient that the Direct
testing tool. We investigate this by conducting the same tests on both tools
and comparing the results.
3.3 Strategy for Validation of Hypotheses
Testing of the prototype tools have two purposes:
 establish the validity of the testing strategies;
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 compare the two strategies in order decide whether the Abadi/Lamport
testing tool is more efficient as postulated.
The testing tools are empolyed on a sample of 15 example decompositions;
both tools are tested with all examples. Among the examples are both correct
and incorrect decompositions. The examples are artificial, but we believe
they are representative for a large class of contract decompositions. A more
detailed description of the examples is found in section 8.2.
In order to compare the two testing tools, we monitor the following vari-
ables:
 whether the example decompositions are validated or not;
 the number of test cases generated and executed;
 the time used for generating and executing test cases;
 the symbol coverage achived during execution of a set of test cases.
Restrictions
To the specifications in the examples we have imposed the following restric-
tions:
 We only test on time independent behavior.
 The specifications do not contain variables (in a programming language
sense).
 We do not specify environments which respond to feedback from com-
ponents.
3.4 Success Criteria
In order to say that we have been able to verify our hypotheses (or at least
not falsified them) we require that the following success criteria are fulfilled:
 We are able to simulate the behavior of the two tools by prototypes
that work for the selected examples.
 The two testing tools validate exactly the same examples.
 The correct examples are validated and the incorrect examples are not
validated.
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In addition we hope to find:
 The Abadi/Lamport testing tool is more efficient that the Direct testing
tool.
 The tracability of the Abadi/Lamport testing tool is better than the
tracability of the Direct testing tool.
By more efficient we mean use of shorter and fewer test cases and less time,
without decreasing the “quality” of the tests. By tracability we mean the
support for finding errors in a not validated decomposition.
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Chapter 4
Specifications, Semantics and
Composition
In this chapter we describe the specification language used and define se-
mantics. As specification language we use a subset of the Specification and
Description Language (SDL). This subset is defined in section 4.1.
In section 4.2 we motivate the use of a stream based semantics from the
Focus method and define general semantics. In section 4.3 the SDL subset
is formalized using the defined semantics.
4.1 Specifications
As specification language we use a subset of the Specification and Description
Language (SDL). The parts of SDL we use are:
 The reserved words
SYSTEM which specifies the name of an SDL system;
BLOCK which specifies the name of an SDL block;
PROCESS which specifies the name of an SDL process;
SIGNAL which specifies the signals used in a block or process inter-
action diagram;
SIGNALLIST which is used for defining sets of signals;
VIA which is used to specify which channel a signal is sent over;
NONE which is used for specifying spontaneous transitions in state
transition diagrams;
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ANY which is used for specifying non-deterministic choices in state
transition diagrams;
DCL which is used for specifying local variables in processes;
TRUE and FALSE which denote the boolean values;
 the special symbol
* which is used to specify any other input;
 block interaction digrams with
– blocks, represented by
– unidirected channels without delay, represented by unidirected ar-
rows;
– text boxes for declarations of signals, signallists and variables,
represented by
A
 process interaction diagrams with
– processes, represented by
   @@
@@   
– unidirected channels without delay, represented by unidirectional
arrows;
– text boxes for declarations of signals, signallists and variables;
 state transition diagrams with
– start states, represented by



– states, represented by
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– input of signals, represented by
@@
  
– output of signals, represented by
  
@@
– choices (boolean and non-deterministic only), represented by
  
@@
@@
  
– tasks (assignment only), represented by
– transitions, represented by arrows between states with inputs, out-
puts, choices and tasks attached to them;
These constructs are more thouroghly described in section 4.3, where we
define semantics for this subset of SDL.
4.2 Semantics
As semantic model for the chosen specification language we use infinite timed
streams like the underlying semantics of the Focusmethod [Broy and Stølen,
2001]. Most of the definitions of streams and operations on streams are from
Focus.
The SDL standard provides semantics for SDL. This semantics, however,
has several weaknesses and ambiguities, and cannot be considered to be a
formal semantics [Hinkel, 1998a]. When we define semantics for SDL in sec-
tion 4.3 we do our best to model the intentions of the standardized semantics
of SDL, but do not consider this semantics beyond that.
There exists state-based semantics for state machines. One example is
found in [Pnueli and Shalev, 1991], which proposes a semantics for State-
charts [Harel, 1987]. In such semantics the main objectiv is to describe the
state of a system or component for each step in a computation.
Our focus, however, lies on communication and interaction between a
system and its environment and between system components. We therefore
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adopt a blackbox view and let systems and components be characterized by
their input and output rather than their internal states. Also, since we are
occupied with distributed systems, we find the notion of global states, that
e.g. [Pnueli and Shalev, 1991] uses, not suitable for our work.
4.2.1 Timed Streams
Components communicate by the means of sending streams of messages over
directed channels. In addition to messages there is also a time tick (denotedp
) which represent time. An infinite timed stream is a sequence of an infinite
number of ticks and possibly an infinite number of messages. Each tick
represents the end of a time unit, and for all j 2 N there can be arbitrary finite
number of messages between the j’th and the (j + 1)’th tick. A finite timed
stream always ends with a tick, so a timed stream can never be truncated
between two messages, which would be to truncate the stream in the middle
of a time unit.
Transmission of a message m over a channel c is instantaneous, which
means that the output of m and the input of m happens within the same
unit of time.
The behavior of a system or a component is defined as a relation between
the input streams and output streams of that system or component. Since
this is a binary relation, if defines a set of pairs of tuples of streams. This
set may be called a input/output relation and its element are refered to as
input/output pairs. An input/output pair can be viewed as a recording of
a possible behavior of a system or system componet; as a communication
history for that system or component. Since the streams contain infinite
many ticks, a communication history is complete and may describe a possible
behavior of a non-terminating system. An input/output pair is also refered
to as a behavior.
A stream is written as a sequence of messages and ticks divided by com-
mas and enclosed in angular brackets (h i). An example stream could be
s = hm1; m2;p; m3;p;p; m4;p; m5;pi
4.2.2 Definitions
This section contains definitions of basic types and operations on streams.
Most of the definitions are borrowed from or inspired by Focus. Throughout
this thesis all logical operators and operations on sets have the usual meaning.
We use the following notation for sets:
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 N is the set of all natural numbers,
N =def f0; 1; 2; 3; : : :g
 N+ denote the set of all positive natural numbers,
N+ =
def N n f0g
 N1 is the set of natural numbers extended with an element 1, which
represtent a number greater than all natural numbers,
N1 =
def N [ f1g
 B is the set of boolean values,
B =def ftrue; falseg
 2A is the powerset of A when A is a set,
2A =
def fBjB  Ag
For a set of messages D we have:
 Dp is the union of D and the time tick,
Dp =
def
D [ fpg
 D1 is the set of all infinite timed streams with messages formD. Math-
ematically a stream s 2 D1 is a mapping from positive natural num-
bers to messages, so
D1 =
def fs 2 N+ ! Dpj8j 2 N+9k 2 N : k  j ^ s(k) = pg
 D is the set of all finite timed streams with messages from D,
D =
def
[
n2N
([1 : : : n]! Dp)
where [1 : : : n] is an interval of natural numbers.
 D! is the set of all timed streams with messages from D,
D! =
def
D1 [D
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We define the following operations for manipulating streams:
 " denote the empty stream, i.e. a stream without any messages or ticks.
 : : D!  N+ ! Dp is used to get the messages on a certain place in a
stream. If s is a stream then s:k is the k’th message of s.
s:k =
def
s(k)
 a : D!D! ! D! is the concatenation operator. If s and r are stream,
sar is the stream with the messages of s followed by the messages of r.
If s 2 D1 then sar = s. If s = (s1; s2; : : : ; sk) and r = (r1; r2; : : : ; rk)
are tuples of streams then
sar = (s1ar1; s2ar2; : : : ; skark)
 sk denotes the stream s repeated k times.
sk = sasa   as| {z }
k times
 & : DD! ! D! is used for appending a message to the beginning of
a stream
m&s =
def hmias
 # : D! ! N1 denote the length of a stream. If s is a stream then #s
is the number of messages in s.
#" =
def
0
#(m&s) =
def
#s + 1
 v: D!D! ! B is the prefix relation. If s and r are streams, we have
s v r =def 9u 2 D! : sau = r
 s : 2Dp  D! ! D! is the filtering operator. If M  Dp and s is a
stream, Mss denote the string obtained be removing all occurrences
of the messages not in M from s.
Ms" =def "
m 2M )Ms(m&s) =def m&(Mss)
m =2M )Ms(m&s) =def Mss
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 #: D1N1 ! D! is used to truncate a stream after a number of ticks.
s#t=def
8<:
s if t =1
" if t = 0
r otherwise, where r v s ^#(fpgsr) = t ^ r:#r = p
If s = (s1; s2; : : : ; sk) is a tuple of streams, we let
s#t=def (s1#t; s2#t; : : : ; sk#t)
When the order of the streams in a tuple is unrelevant, we sometimes view
a tuple of streams as a set of streams and apply set operators to them.
4.2.3 System and Components
In the semantics, systems and system components are specified in the same
manner. Whether we in the following operate with system of components or
component of sub-components will not make any differece. A system can be
viewed a component at the topmost level.
Figure 4.1 shows a component M with input channels i and output chan-
nels o. In textual notation we denote this component asM(i o), where the
 is used as a deliminator between the input channels and output channels.
M- -
i o
Figure 4.1: Component M
Semantically we think of systems and components as predicates over
tuples of streams. If M has n input channels and m output channels and D
is the set of messages that can be sent over these channels, we let a predicate
[[M ]] : (D!)n  (D!)m ! B
denote the semantic meaning of M . [[M ]] is usually refered to as the denota-
tion of M . This denotation is the input/output relation of M . A specified
system or componenet is also refered to as a specification.
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i1 i2
o1 o2
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M1 M2
-
l1

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Glassbox view
i1 i2
o1 o2
? ?
? ?
Blackbox view
Figure 4.2: Two views of composition
4.2.4 Composition
In Focus one way of making composite specifications is dataflow diagrams,
where boxes represent components and directed arrows represent channels or
tuples of channels.
To a composition we adobt either a blackbox or a glassbox view. With
the blackbox view we are only able to observe the external behavior of the
composition, while we with the glassbox view are able to look inside the
composition and observe the internal structure and communication of the
composition. Figure 4.2 shows these two views of composition.
When a composition is made, there are channel that are external and
channels that are internal relative to the composition. The streams over in-
ternal channels are communication between the combined components and
the streams over external channels are the communication between the com-
position and its environment. If M is a composition, we let iM and oM
denote the tuples of external input and output streams respectively and let
lM denote the tuple of internal streams.
In textual notation we use the symbols ⊗ and  to denote composition.
⊗ is the most general compositon operator, because it allows the composites
to have mutual feedback, i.e., they may be sending messages to each other.
If
M(iM  oM) = M1(iM1  oM2)⊗M2(iM2  oM2)
we have
lM = (oM1 \ iM2) [ (oM2 \ iM2)
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Figure 4.3: Composition
iM = (iM1 [ iM2) n lM
oM = (oM1 [ oM2) n lM
Piping
M(iM  oM) = M1(iM1  oM2) M2(iM2  oM2)
is the special case of mutual feedback when
oM1 = iM2 = lM ^ oM2 \ iM1 = ;
Examples of the two types of composition are shown in figure 4.3.
The ⊗ operator is cummutative
M1 ⊗M2 = M2 ⊗M1
and if the component’s sets of input streams are disjoint (iMj \ iMk = ; when
j 6= k), also assosiative
(M1 ⊗M2)⊗M3 = M1 ⊗ (M2 ⊗M3)
This requirement on the sets of inputs streams is ensured by disallowing
splitting of channels, so that a channel can only connect two components
and a channel from the environment can only give input to one component.
Because of these properties of the ⊗ operator, there is no need for defining
composition of more than two components.
Semantically we interpret composition as logical conjunction. If
M = M1 ⊗M2
and (i; o) is a possible behavior of M , we have:
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 i is a tuple of streams on the external input channels of M ;
 o is a tuple of streams on the external output channels of M ;
 there exists streams l = (l1; l2; : : : ; lk) over the internal channels of M
that are possible communications between the components;
 i \ l = ; ^ l \ o = ; ^ i \ o = ;, and for each j = f1; 2g
(iMj  i [ l) ^ (oMj  l [ o)
so within (i; l; o) there are a possible behavior for both M1 and M2.
The triplet (i; l; o) contains possible behavior for both M1 and M2 at the
same time. This is necessary because the components are assumed to run in
parallel. Because the predicates that denote the components then are true
at the same time, we can semantically interpret composition as conjunction.
If we adopt a blackbox view of the composition M , we do not see the
internal channels, so in the semantic understanding of blackbox composition
we hide the internal streams. The hiding is done with the existential quan-
tifier 9 since it is enough that there exists one possible stream over each of
the internal channels.
Hence we get the following definition of composition:
Definition 4.1 (Composition) If
M = M1 ⊗M2
with k internal channels of type D, then
[[M ]] =
def
[[M1]] ^ [[M2]]
in glassbox view, and
[[M ]] =
def 9lM 2 (D!)k : [[M1]] ^ [[M2]]
where
lM = (oM1 \ iM2) [ (oM2 \ iM2)
in blackbox view. 
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4.2.5 Refinement
We say that a specification S 0 refines a specification S if all behaviors in [[S 0]]
are contained in [[S]]. If a specification S is refined by a specification S 0, we
denote this as
S  S 0
The formal definition of the refinement relation is:
Definition 4.2 (Refinement of specifications) If S and S 0 are specific-
ations, then
S  S 0 =def [[S 0]]) [[S]]

This definition asserts that S 0 is a refinement of S if every possible behavior
of S 0 is a possible behavior of S. The use of implication gives the refinement
relation the property that if there are possible behaviors of S that are not
possible behaviors of S 0, S 0 can still be a refinement of S.
This means that if S  S 0, then S 0 specify the same system or component
as S since S 0 has no “new” behaviors that S has not, but that S is less
deterministic that S 0 (and S 0 probably closer to implementation than S)
because there can be behaviors of S that are not behaviors of S 0.
It is worth noticing that this definition only covers refinement of behavior,
and not, for instance, refinement of interface. The number of external input
and output streams are the same on both side of a refinement.
(An effect of this definition is that e.g. a rock will refine (and implement)
all specified systems, because a rock has no behaviors in our interpretation
of behavior. [[Srock]] = false, so ([[Srock]]) [[S]]) = true for any specification
S and behavior (i; o).)
Sets and predicates are essentially the same thing, so the denotation of a
specification can be seen as a set of behaviors (input/output pairs). Implic-
ation then correspond to the subset relation, so the refinement S  S 0 can
also be defined as
[[S 0]]  [[S]]
[[S]] is true for a behavior (i; o) if and only if (i; o) 2 [[S]]. The only situations
where the refinement does not hold is when [[S 0]] is true for (i; o), i.e., (i; o) 2
[[S 0]], and [[S]] is false, i.e., (i; o) =2 [[S]].
We use the two notions of denotation and refinement interchangeable.
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4.2.6 Safety and Liveness
Requirements of a system or component can be devided into safety properties
and liveness properties. Informally safety properties are requirements that
can be falsified in finite time, while liveness properties are requirements are
that only can be falsified in infinite time.
When we formalize safety and liveness, we get the following definition.
Definition 4.3 (Safety and liveness properties) A predicate P : (D!)n
(D!)m ! B is a safety property iff
8i; o : [8t 2 N : 9z 2 (D!)m : z#t= o#t ^P (i; z)]) P (i; o)
A predicate P : (D!)n  (D!)m ! B is a liveness property iff
8i; o : 8t 2 N : 9z 2 (D!)m : z#t= o#t ^P (i; z)

4.2.7 Interleaving
Specifications can be interpreted to be interleaving or non-interleaving. If a
specification is non-interleaving it allows actions or events to happen simul-
taneously. Interleaving specifications do not allow this, so that all actions or
events must by ordered.
Our semantics are interleaving; to make it non-interleaving would add
complexity. According to [Hoare, 1985, page 24] it is possible to manage well
without non-interleaving. In [Hoare, 1985] processing and sending messages
are carried out in no-time, operations that need a noticeable amount of time
are described as two actions; one that starts the operation and one that ends
it.
As we explain in section 4.3.4, all input streams to a component are
merged into a queue. If two merged streams both have messages between the
j’th and the (j + 1)’th time tick we have no way of knowing their ordering,
so their order in the queue is arbitrary.
All communication between components is done by interchanging mes-
sages. The only shared variables between two componets are their common
streams, so problems concerning shared variables are prevented. Writing
(i.e., outputting) to a stream does not affect the data (i.e., messages) already
in the stream, and cannot prevent another component reading data (i.e.,
receiving messages) from the stream.
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4.2.8 Causality
Generally we want to specify systems which follows our intuitve understand-
ing of causalty between input and output, i.e., that a system is not allowed
to produce output based on input it has not yet received. Executable spe-
cifications and systems cannot fail to be causal. It is impossible to realize a
system that does computations on input it has not received.
In order to avoid specifications that are not caual, we add causalty con-
straints to specifications. We distinguish between two types of causalty; weak
causalty and strong causalty. Both are formalized in the below definition.
Definition 4.4 (Causalty) A predicate P : (D!)n  (D!)m ! B is weakly
causal iff
8x; y : 8t 2 N : x#t= y#t) fo#t jP (x; o)g = fo#t jP (y; o)g
A predicate P : (D!)n  (D!)m ! B is strongly causal iff
8x; y : 8t 2 N : x#t= y#t) fo#t+1 jP (x; o)g = fo#t+1 jP (y; o)g

4.3 Semantics for SDL
In this section the subset of SDL defined in section 4.1 is formalized in the
semantics described above. This formalization is based on [Holz and Stølen,
1995], [Hinkel, 1998a] and [Hinkel, 1998b].
As mentioned in section 4.2, the SDL standard contains a semi-formal se-
mantics for SDL. We refer to this as the SDL semantics. In this formalization
we do our best to model the intentions of the SDL semantics.
The main structures of SDL specifications are systems, blocks and pro-
cesses (see section 2.1). By the expression SDL specification we refer to an
SDL system. For each SDL specification we assosiate a Focus specification,
so they are semantically interpreted as predicates.
4.3.1 Systems and Blocks
SDL systems are specified by block interaction diagrams and SDL blocks
are specified by block interaction diagrams or process interaction diagrams.
Both types of interaction diagrams are dataflow diagrams, and are used for
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specifying the static structure of SDL specifications. Block interaction dia-
grams consist of SDL blocks connected by channels, while process interaction
diagrams consist of SDL processes connected by channels.
For each interaction diagram we assosiate a Focus dataflow diagram.
SDL systems and blocks are then semantically interpreted as predicates where
the semantics rule of composition defined in section 4.2.4 apply.
4.3.2 Signals
SDL processes communicate by interchanging signals. In the semantics each
SDL signal is assosiated with a Focus message. Signals used in an SDL
specification must be declared in a textbox at the same level as or an outer
level from where they are used. The reserved word SIGNALLIST can be
used to group signals in sets. The textbox
ASIGNAL m1; m2; m3;
SIGNALLIST M = m1; m2; m3;
has the semantic meaning that m1,m2 and m3 are messages in the specifica-
tion the textbox appears and
M = fm1; m2; m3g
is a set of messages.
4.3.3 Channels
For each channel in an SDL specification we assosiate a Focus channel. We
can do this since we have restricted the SDL specifications to only contain
directed channels with instantaneous signal passing. This correspond to Fo-
cus channsls, which always are directed and without delay.
In SDL the signals that can be passed over a channel are listed in brackets
([ ]) attached to the channel. In this list there may be signals and signallists.
Signallists are emphasized by paranteses. Semantically the list attached to a
channel defines the type of the channel. A channel
-d
[(M); m4]
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is of the type
D = M [ fm4g
and for a stream s over d we have s 2 D!.
4.3.4 Processes
SDL processes are state transition diagrams (state machines) and used for
specifying the behavior of SDL specifications. These state transition dia-
grams are formalized by the means of stream processing functions.
In the SDL semantics, processes have a number of implicit features. In our
formalization we express these features explicit in the below Focus model
for SDL processes. This section also provides interpretations of time, safety
and liveness, and causalty for SDL processes.
Focus Model of SDL Processes
An SDL process PR, shown in figure 4.4, is modeled by the Focus dataflow
diagram shown in figure 4.5. In the SDL semantics signals over the input
channels to an SDL process are inserted into an input queue from which the
process receives the signals. The signals are put into the queue in the order
the arrive. In our semantics this means that if a message m1 arrive over i1
after j time ticks and m2 arrive over i2 after k time ticks, m1 is placed ahead
of m2 in the queue if j < k. If j = k we have no way of knowing which
message arrived first and they are arbitrarily ordered in the queue. This
queue is modeled by a special component FM (fair merge), which is defined
in section 4.3.5.
Spontaneous transitions in SDL are specified by input of a special sig-
nal NONE. The componenet NG outputs a stream of messages none with
arbitrary many tick between each none. According to [Hinkel, 1998b], the
denotation of NG can be defined as
[[NG(z)]] =
def true
where
z 2 fnoneg1
since all streams of only ticks and nones are possible behaviors of NG. This
means that also the stream of zero nones is a legal behavior of NG.
The component PR0 represents the explicit specified behavior of PR, i.e.,
the behavior specified by the state transition diagram of the SDL process
PR.
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Figure 4.5: Focus model of PR
Denotation of SDL Processes
When we define the denotation of an SDL process, the state transition dia-
gram of the SDL process is translated to a set of equations on stream pro-
cessing functions. To each state we assosiate a function (with the same name
as the state) and each transition between states is translated to an equation.
How this translation is done is shown in section 4.3.7 by the means of nine
example cases.
All SDL processes have exactly one start state. The start state is repres-
ented by a special symbol and is not named in the diagram. For each SDL
process PR we call this state startPR and assert that control always starts
in this state.
We assume that the input and output streams have the following types
i1 2 I!1 ; i2 2 I!2 ; : : : ; in 2 I!n
o1 2 O!1 ; o2 2 O!2 ; : : : ; om 2 O!m
We then have that i 2 I! where
I = I1 [ I2 [    [ In [ fnoneg
We use the short hand notation
iPR = i1; i2; : : : ; in
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oPR = o1; o2; : : : ; om
for the input and output streams, and
I!PR = I
!
1  I!2      I!n
O!PR = O
!
1 O!2      O!m
for the types.
Because SDL processes are time independent (except for the timer con-
struct we have omitted from the subset), the stream processing functions in
the translation of an SDL state transition diagram work on time independent
streams. We let
ı = Isi
oPR = O1so1; O2so2; : : : ; Omsom
denote i and oPR with the time ticks removed.
We assume that PR has l control states s0; s1; : : : ; sl−1, and TPR is the set of
equations on time independent stream processing functions obtained by the
semantic translation of the state transition diagram of SDL process PR.
The denotation of PR0 is defined to be
[[PR0]] = (oPR = startPR(ı))
where startPR; s0; s1; : : : ; sl−1 so that 8ı; oPR :
V
tr2TPR tr
The where-so that clause defines the functions startPR; s0; s2; : : : ; sl−1 to
be the functions that solve the conjunction of the equations in TPR.
With the denotation [[PR0]], PR0 is not causal, so we have to ensure that
the implicit causalty of SDL process PR is maintained in the translation to
time independent functions.
In order to do this, we use the concept of strategies from Focus. We
adopt the view that a specified component is playing a game. In this game the
component receives input and produces output, and it wins if the resulting
input/output pair satisfies its specification. The component plays according
to a strategy, and if the component can always win a game, independent of
the input it receives, it has a winning strategy.
Formally a strategy for an SDL process is a function  2 I! ! O!PR, and
is a winning strategy if
8i 2 I! : [[PR0]][oPR(i) ]
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where [[PR0]][oPR(i) ] means [[PR
0]] with all occurrences of oPR substituted by
(i). A strategy is weakly causal if
8x; y 2 I!; t 2 N : x#t= y#t) (x)#t= (y)#t
and strongly causal if
8x; y 2 I!; t 2 N : x#t= y#t) (x)#t+1= (y)#t+1
Weakly and strongly causal strategies are defined by using respectively !W
and!S in their signatures. For an SDL process PR we define the set of causal
strategies to be
strT(PR
0) =
def f 2 I! !T O!PRj8i 2 I! : [[PR0]][oPR(i) ]g
In order to add causalty to PR0 we define a new specification PR00, which
has the denotation
[[PR00]] = 9 2 strS(PR0) : (i) = oPR
The full denotation of the SDL process PR becomes
[[PR(iPR  oPR)]] = [[(NG(z) ⊗ FM(z; iPR  i))  PR00(i oPR)]]
Non-determinism
There are two ways of specifying non-determinism in SDL; input of NONE
and choices with the reserved word ANY. Input of NONE is modeled by
the NG component described above.
An ANY-choice in a transition asserts that all of the branches of the
choice are enabled and any of them can be followed. This non-deterministic
choice is modeled with a special kind of variable called oracle. An oracle is an
arbitrary sequence of natural numbers which predicts the non-deterministic
choices made in the future.
We need oracles because we define the denotation of an SDL process by
the conjunction of equations on stream processing functions. Non-determinism
could be modeled by defining the denotation by use of disjunction instead
of conjunction. We feel oracles are more natural since SDL is a specification
language that originally was deterministic and later got non-deterministic
features added to it. In addition, oracles makes it easier to express fairness
constraints.
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Figure 4.6: Interpretation of time in an SDL transition
Time
SDL has an ambiguous notion of time [Hinkel, 1998b]. In our semantics we
follow [Hinkel, 1998b] and make the assumption that time always passes.
There is nothing peculiar about this assumption; it is rather an intuitive
interpretation of time. Every implementation of an SDL specification will
have the property that time is running while it is executed.
Message passing is instantaneous, so there is no delay between output and
input of a message. There is delay when an SDL process is in a control state
waiting for input, and between events (e.g. input and output) in a transition
(we make some exceptions in section 5.3.2). This delay is undefined, i.e., we
know time is passing, but not how much. Figure 4.6 (from [Hinkel, 1998a])
illustrates how events in a transition in an SDL Process PR are spread along
the time axis.
Safety and Liveness of SDL Specifications
SDL processes are executable state machines, and can specify arbitrary com-
putational safety properties. They specify which transition and input and
output events are allowed to happen when in a given state. Any other event
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that occure is a violation of the specification. When an event has occured
it necessarily has occured within finite time, so any state machine can be
violated in finite time.
Arbitrary liveness properties cannot be expressed explicitly by state ma-
chines. There are for instance no way of specifying that a state machine
eventually will reach a specific state or produce a specific output. It is how-
ever possible to let state machines to have implicit liveness. A way to do
this is to say that a state machine are not allowed to stay in a state forever
if a transition from that state is enabled and remains enabled forever. For
example the in semantics for Statecharts in [Pnueli and Shalev, 1991] the
assumption is made that all enabled transitions are carried out. The same
assumption is also often made about computer programs, although not ne-
cessarily explicitly stated. This assumption may be called weak fairness, as
opposed to strong fairness which states that an event cannot be enabled in-
finitely many times without happening. For example [Abadi and Lamport,
1995] uses the notions of weak and strong fairness.
To our SDL specifications we impose a weak fairness constraint which
assert that a transition cannot stay enabled forever without happening and
that time always proceeds. We do not consider liveness in the further discus-
sion. Leaving out liveness allow us to make simplifications to the semantics
and allow us to make a simpler composition rule than we would otherwise
need.
Causalty of SDL Processes
Since SDL specifications are executable they are bound to be causal. We
therefore impose causalty constraints to the semantics of SDL specifications.
Because we focus on time independent specifications (delays are undefined)
the time units can be arbitrarily small. Small time units will not make re-
strictions to what we are able to specify; time units are a way of ordering
events along the time axis, and the ordering cannot be violated by dividing
the time units into smaller time units. If the time units are sufficiently small,
it can be ensured that an input and an output as response to the input do
not occure within the same time unit. Because of this, an SDL process is
strongly causal if the time units are sufficiently small.
4.3.5 Fair Merge
A fair merge component FM which merges two timed streams i1 and i2 into
i is defined as
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Figure 4.8: Focus model of merge at gate
[[FM(i1; i2  i)]] = 9or 2 f1; 2g1 : i = fm[or](i1; i2)
where fm so that 8i1; i2; i; or :
fm[or](
p
&i1;
p
&i2) =
p
&fm[or](i1; i2)
^ fm[or](m1&i1;p&i2) = m1&fm[or](i1;p&i2)
^ fm[or](p&i1; m2&i2) = m2&fm[or](p&i1; i2)
^ fm[1&or](m1&i1; m2&i2) = m1&fm[or](i1; m2&i2)
^ fm[2&or](m1&i1; m2&i2) = m2&fm[or](m1&i1; i2)
where or is an oracle and m1 and m2 denote any messages. Merges with
more than to input streams can easily be defined in the same manner.
The fair merge is assumed to be instantaneous, i.e., there is no delay
between input and output.
4.3.6 Merge at Gate
The place where a channel meets the bounderies of an SDL block is called a
gate. In some situations output channels from processes in a block may meet
at a gate, as the channels b and c in figure 4.7. Semantically we interpret
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Figure 4.9: Transition cases 1-4
this as there being a fair merge component at the gate. A Focus model of
the SDL block blk is shown in figure 4.8.
4.3.7 Translation of SDL State Transition Diagrams
Figures 4.9 to 4.12 show nine examples of transitions in SDL state transition
diagrams. In all examples we assume that the input stream is named i. The
conjunction of these examples should give a good picture of how the transla-
tion from SDL state transition diagrams to equations on stream processing
functions is done. In these translations all stream processing functions are
time independent.
States and Transitions
The cases in figure 4.9 are all single transitions, and are therefore translated
into single equations.
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Figure 4.10: Transition cases 5 and 6
Case 1 is a transition form the start state to the first ordinary state and is
translated to
startPR(ı) = s0(ı)
Case 2 is also a transition from the start state, but with output of a message:
startPR(ı) = out1&s0(ı)
Case 3 is a transition with input of in1 and output of two messages:
s0(in1&ı) = hout1; out2ias1(ı)
Case 4 is a transition with input of in1 and then a task with assignment of
an expression E to a local variable v. We translate this to
s0[](in1&ı) = s0[[v := E]](ı)
where  is a list of local variable and [v := E] denotes the list  with v
updated by E.
Both cases in figure 4.10 consist of two transitions, and are therefore trans-
lated into two equations.
Case 5 is translated to
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Figure 4.11: Transition cases 7 and 8
s0(in1&ı) = out1&s1(ı)
s0(in2&ı) = out2&s2(ı)
Case 6 has two output channels and the transitions do output to different
channels:
s0(in1&ı) = (hout1i; ")as1(ı)
s0(in2&ı) = ("; hout2i)as2(ı)
Choices and ANY
Figure 4.11 shows transitions with choices. Each of these transitions are
translated to a single equation, were we use if -operators (with the usual se-
mantics) to denote the choice.
Case 7 is a boolean choice and is translated to
s0(in1&ı) = if C then out1&s1(ı)
else out2&s2(ı)
where C is a boolean condition.
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Figure 4.12: Transition case 9
Case 8 contains a non-deterministic choice. This is resolved by the means of
an oracle or. The transition is translated to
s0[r&or](in1&ı) = if r = 1 then out1&s1[or](ı)
elseif r = 2 then out2&s2[or](ı)
and the denotation of the SDL process is quantified by
9or 2 f1; 2g1
at the outermost level.
Asterisk Input and Implicit Transition
Case 9 has three transitions where one of them are triggered by the asterisk
(*) input. This is interpreted as “any other input”, and is closely related to
the implicit transition.
If I is the set of all possible input to the SDL process (the type of the
input queue), then “any other input” in state s0 in Case 9 must be input
from the set I n fin1; in2g. The asterisk input does however not apply to the
none message, so the translation is
s0(in1&ı) = out1&s1(ı)
s0(in2&ı) = out2&s2(ı)
m 2 I n fin1; in2; noneg ) s0(m&ı) = out3&s3(ı)
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Implicit tranisiton is a transition which resambles the “any other input” tran-
istion. In all SDL processes there is an implicit transition for each state ex-
cept the start state. The implicit transition processes any input that does
not enable any transition in the current state of the SDL process and brings
control to the same state without carrying out any other tasks.
For each state sk we assosiate a set Msk of all messages that enables
transitions when control is in state sk. To model the implicit transition, an
equation
m 2 I nMsk ) sk(m&i) = sk(i)
is added for each state sk.
Notice that for Case 9, I nMs0 = fnoneg. If transitions from a state sk
include both a transition with input of none and a transition with asterisk
input, then I nMsk = ;.
4.3.8 PID and SENDER
In addition to the defined SDL subset, we define semantics for the SDL type
PID and the special expression SENDER. (For explanation see section
7.3.2).
Every process in an SDL specification has a unique process instance iden-
tifier (pid). Variables that hold these pids are of the predefined type PID.
Semantically we interpret the type PID as a subset PID of N. We let
P be the set of all processes in an SDL specification (system), and define a
function
:pid : P ! N
which for each process P 2 P returns the pid for P . The type PID is then
defined as
PID =
def fn 2 Nj9P 2 P : P:pid = ng
Since all processes have a unique pid we add the constraint
8P 2 P : 9n 2 PID : P:pid = n ^ (8Q 2 P : P 6= Q) n 6= Q:pid)
Every message sent between processes carry with them the the pid of the
process from which they are sent. We interpret this as hidden parameter of
the message, and define a :pid function for messages as well.
:pid : M ! N
where M is the set of all messages in a specification.
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In SDL processes the reserved word SENDER can be used to get the pid
of the last processed signal. The only interesting use of SENDER (at least
for us) is in the transition tiggered by the signal to which SENDER apply.
When we do the semantic translation of a transition in which SENDER is
used, we merely substitute SENDER with the function :pid applied to the
message processed in the resulting equation.
An example in which this is used can be seen in the definition of the
Switch component in section 7.3.2.
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Chapter 5
Contract Oriented Specifications
In this chapter we introduce the format of contract oriented specifications we
use in this thesis. In section 5.1 we describe the notion of contract oriented
specifications and formalize their semantics. In section 5.2 behavioral refine-
ment of contract specifications is discussed. Section 5.3 provides a scheme for
making contract oriented specifications with SDL as specification language.
5.1 Formalization of Contract Oriented Specific-
ations
In the contract oriented style a component C is specified by an assumption
A and a guarantee G. Together they form the specification S of C, and we
write S = (A;G).
Contract oriented specifications are based on the principle that a specified
component should fulfil the guarantee as long as the assumption is met.
Informally the relationship between A and G is:
 A describes the behavior of the relevant part of the environment under
which C is required work as specified;
 G describes the behavior guaranteed by C when the environment be-
haves according to A.
The environment of a component consists of other components in the system
it belongs, and possibly the external environment of the whole system. It is
obvious that A cannot specify the whole environment of C, since this would
be a specification of the rest of the system and the environment. When we
say that A specifies the relevant part of C’s environment, we mean that A
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specifies the environment from C’s point of view. In practice A will mainly
specify the format of the input to C.
G specifies the functionality of C. If C should be specified with a tuple of
input channels i and a tuple of output channels o, then G must have the same
input channels i and output channels o. Since A specifies the behavior of the
relevant part of C’s envioronment, the output of A must be i. Symmetrically
the input of A must be o, since C should be allowed to interact with its
environment. (In section 5.3 we make some simplifications in this respect.)
This relationship is shown graphically as a dataflow diagram in figure 5.1.
A G- -
?
i o
o
Figure 5.1: Relationship between A and G
A component will typically give feedback to its environment and the envir-
onment will be able to behave according to this feedback. The environment
of a component will usually consist of other components and we must ex-
pect components in a composite system to be mutual dependent upon the
messages they send to each other. A component may even be able to send
messages to itself. This may lead to circularities that make reasoning about
composition of parallel components a non-trivial matter.
In order to make reasoning about specifications with this kind of circu-
laries easier, we follow [Abadi and Lamport, 1995] and add the requirement
to the contract specifications that the guarantee G of a specification S must
hold as long as the assumption A holds and at least one step longer. Since
we use a semantics based on timed streams, this step will be equal to one
time unit. When we formalize the notion of contract specifications, this new
requirement must be present.
A realized system is always causal, and some delay between input and
output must be assumed due to use of computational time. Because of this,
the required one time unit delay in the guarantee of a specification does not
restrict the class of realizable systems we are able to specify.
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5.1.1 Definition of Contract Specifications
A component C with n input channels and m output channels of type D is
specified by a contract specification
S = (A;G)
where A and G are predicates over timed streams of type D!:
A : (D!)m  (D!)n ! B
G : (D!)n  (D!)m ! B
For a contract specification S = (A;G) we define its denotation [[S]]:
Definition 5.1 (Denotation of contract specification) If S is a con-
tract specification S = (A;G) of a component with n input streams and m
output streams of type D, then
[[S]] =
def 8t 2 N : A(o#t; i#t)) G(i#t; o#t+1)

This definition captures both the requirement that the guarantee should hold
as long as the assumption holds and the “one step longer” requirement.
The use of implication in the definition captures the fact that we do not
specify the behavior of the component when the assumption fails. In the
case where the assumption is false at time t, [[S]] is trivially fulfilled at any
time t0 > t, no matter what the guarantee specifies. We interpret this as the
specified component starts to produce chaos, i.e., any possible output, after
the “plus one”-step.
In a way the specification is closed since the assumptions on the context
of the specified component are made explicite and the component is specified
under these assumptions. A componenent may implement a specification
even if the assumption of the specification is false in the context. This is not
remarkable. If the environment of a component does not meet the assump-
tions this does not necessarily mean that there is something wrong with the
component.
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5.2 Behavioral Refinement of Contract Specific-
ations
In section 4.2.5 we define a refinement relation  , and state that in our
definition this relation only applies to refinement of behavior. There are two
ways of making a legal behavioral refinement of contract specifications [Abadi
and Lamport, 1990]:
1. Strengthening the guarantee, i.e, making it more specific (less general).
2. Weakening the assumption, i.e., making it more general (less specific).
By this we mean that a refinement
(A;G) (A0; G0)
is a legal behavioral refinement if
1. G0 ) G
2. A) A0
This correspond to, e.g., strengthening of a Hoare triple in [Dahl, 1992], but
is not the most general formulation of the principle. In [Abadi and Lamport,
1990] the form of the principle is:
(A;G) (A0; G0)
if
A) A0
A ^G0 ) A ^G
In [Abadi and Lamport, 1995] a rule is presented, which has the form:
(A;G) (A;G0)
if
A ^G0 ) G
Strenghtening is done by allowing fewer behaviors, i.e., by reducing non-
determinism. Weakening is done by allowing more behaviors, i.e., by increas-
ing non-determinism.
The result is that weakening the assumption reduces the number of be-
haviors with chaos (which is legal behavior) and strengthening the guarantee
makes a specification more concrete (and closer to implementation). Both
ways of making behavioral refinement reduce the number of possible behavi-
ors, which is in corresondence with the use of subset relation in the semantics
of refinement. This can be illustrated by figures 5.2 and 5.3 [den Braber,
2001].
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until t
A = false
from t
G = true
until t + 1
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from t + 1
chaos
(legal behavior)
from t+ 1
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until t+ 1
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Figure 5.2: Behavior in contract specifications
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A = true A = false
G = true
G = false
chaos
legal behavior
illegal behavior
Figure 5.3: Behavioral refinement of contract specifications
5.3 Contracts in SDL
In this section we present a scheme for specifying contract specifications with
SDL as specification language, i.e., an SDL representation of [[(A;G)]]. This
representation of [[(A;G)]] is specified as a special SDL block AG. The goal
is to get an executable representation of contract specifications which fulfil
the equality
[[AG]] = [[(A;G)]]
The semantic relation between AG and (A;G) is discussed in section 5.3.6.
This scheme is made with functional testing of the specifications in mind.
We do not try to make general guidelines of how to represent contracts in
SDL. The purpose of this representation of contracts in SDL is to do exper-
imental testing of the proposed testing strategies.
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Some pragmatism is deployed and the result is probably not the most
general way of making contract specifications with SDL. We do however
account for the pragmatic features when we formalize the SDL contract.
5.3.1 The AG Block
When we specify contracts in SDL, the assumption A and the guaranteeG are
both specified by SDL processes. In the definition of contract specifications,
A is said to describe the behavior of the environment of the component
specified by S = (A;G). As a starting point, A is specified in a simple form
where it only show which messages the environment is allowed to send over
which channels when in a given state. In this simple form the transitions of
each state in A will look like in figure 5.4.
sj
  
@@in1 VIA i1
?
s0
  
@@in2 VIA i2
?
s1
  
@@ink VIA ik
?
sk−1
Figure 5.4: A in simple form
Notice that this is a violation of the SDL syntax. In an SDL process all
transitions, except the transition from the start state, must begin with an
input symbol. It is also worth noticing that figure 5.4 is meant as a general
picture; it shows one of possibly many states in A, and we allow ir = ip and
sr = sp for r 6= p.
Assumptions of this form represent a restriction of the expressiveness of
the contract specifications; only a finite number of possible input messages
can be specified, behavior depending on the computation history cannot be
specified, and feedback is not taken into account. This means that the class of
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Figure 5.5: SDL block for contract specifications
contract specifications expressable by our scheme for SDL contracts is smaller
than (but a proper subset of) the class of contract specifications expressable
by the semantics.
In section 4.3.4 we explain how we can do a semantic translation of SDL
processes into predicates. Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between A and G
as a composition, which according to definition 4.1 should be interpreted as
conjunction. This does not correspond to the denotation [[S]] of S = (A;G),
which is defined by use of implication, nor does it capture the “one step
longer”-semantics used in the definition of [[S]].
Because we are only interested in the behavior of a component as long as
the assumption holds (and because we want to be able test specifications by
the means of test cases), we make the assumption that if the assumption fails
the component will start producing chaos after the “plus one”-step. It is worth
noticing that one possible chaotic behavior is that the component produces
correct output, so the “plus one”-step assert that the component guarantees
correct output in at least one time unit after the assumption fails.
In order to model this, (A;G) is specified by a special SDL block AG,
shown in figure 5.5. Instead of A simulating the environment as would be
the case for the network in figure 5.1, an SDL process CoA that recognizes
legal input is used. The reason for this is a pragmatic one; the testing tool
we build to do functional testing of SDL contracts needs the channel i from
the boundery of the SDL block to CoA in order to monitor the input (see
section 7.2.1). We also make use of this channel when we compose AG blocks
in section 7.3.
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In addtion to recognizing legal (assumed) input, CoA is the part of the
specification that does the chaos production in case the assumption is viol-
ated. As long as CoA receives legal input, the input is forwarded to G over
i0, but if CoA receives unexpected input it ignores all later input and starts
outputting chaos on o00. CoA is a modification of A. How this modification
is done is explained in section 5.3.3.
The Switch component forwards the output of G as long as the assump-
tion is not violated, but switches to forward the output of CoA if CoA starts
producing chaos. In order to model the “plus one”-semantics, Switch has a
delay of one time unit before conducting the switch, i.e., if CoA is violated
after t time ticks, Switch forwards messages from G until time tick t+1 before
switching. In addition, some special time and causalty constraints have to
be made about the components in AG. These are discussed in section 5.3.2.
The Switch component is defined in section 5.3.5
In AG there is also a channel f from G to CoA. This is the feedback
channel, and is used if we want to specify that the environment reponds to
output from the component. Since we already have omitted this possibility
from the specification scheme, the channel f is neither used nor discussed in
the rest of this thesis. The channel appears in the figure as an illustration
of how we believe an extension to SDL contract specifications with feedback
could be done.
For simplicity this AG block has only one input and one output channel,
but the AG block scheme can easily be generalized to handle multiple input
and output channels. For each output channel oj there must be a seperate
Switch component and channels o0j and o00j . The channels i0 and f , however,
need not be multiplied, since CoA and G in any case have input queues that
behave like fair merges.
5.3.2 Interpretation of Time and Causalty
In the AG block we interpret CoA and Switch to be instantaneous. Intuit-
ively this is a reasonable assumption, since they are simple components that
would not use any considerable amount of computational time.
The guarantee G is assumed to have a delay of at least one time unit.
G specifies the functionality of the specified component, and it is resonable
to assume that there is some delay due to use of computational time in the
component.
SDL specifications are executable, and therefore have “built in” causalty.
CoA and Switch are assumed to be weakly causal. Because they are assumed
to be instantaneous, output until time t depends on input until time t.
We assume that G is strongly causal, i.e., that the output until time t+ 1
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Figure 5.6: Transitions in CoA
depends entirely on input until time t. This assumption is supported by
the assumption that G has at least one time unit delay between input and
output.
5.3.3 Modification of A into CoA
The modification of A into CoA has two purposes; transformation from spe-
cifying legal input to recognizing legal input, and adding chaos production
functionality.
All SDL processes have an implicit transition that is triggered every time
the process receives a message that does not trigger any of the specified trans-
itions from the current state. The implicit transition consumes the message
and go back to the current state without performing any other actions. With
an assumption that recognizes legal input, as we use, an implicit transition
will be triggered in exactly the situations where the assumption is violated.
In CoA the implicit transition is overridden by an extra transition from
all states. These transitions bring control to a state chaos if any unexpected
input is received. The result of transforming the transitions of a state sj in A
(figure 5.4) to corresponding transitions in CoA is shown in figure 5.6. The
transition that overrides the implicit transition is emphasized by a dashed
box.
If CoA reaches the chaos state, it ignores all input and starts producing
62 Contract Oriented Specifications
chaos
@@
  NONE


Z
Z
Z
Z


ANY
  
@@out1 VIA o001
?
chaos
  
@@out2 VIA o002
?
chaos
  
@@outn VIA o00n
?
chaos
?
chaos
@@
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Figure 5.7: Chaos transition in CoA
chaos by non-deterministically sending any of the messages in the types of
the output channels or nothing at all. This is specified by adding the state
chaos with the transitions shown in figure 5.7 to CoA.
Note that CoA has k legal inputs in the state sj, and that G (and the
chaos production of CoA) has n possible output messages. Since we have
omitted variables and messages with parameters from this discussion, we are
only able to specify components with a finite number of input and output
messages. This must be seen as a simplification compared to the semantics.
In figure 5.7, the leftmost ANY-branch (with no output) is semantically
obsolete. In section 4.3.4 we define the denotation of NG to be [[NG]] = true,
with the result that the stream of no none messages is a legal behavior of NG.
This transition is present because of the SDL tool we used for conducting
tests, which cannot be said to fulfil this assumption (see section 7.2.1).
5.3.4 Denotation of CoA
If we make the assumption that the block AG has one input channel i of
type I and one output channel o of type O, where
I = fin1; in2; : : : ; inrg
O = fout1; out2; : : : ; outng
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we get the following denotation of CoA:
[[CoA(i;i0; o00)]] = [[(NG(z) ⊗ FM(z; i;q))  CoA0(q  i0; o00)]]
Let SCoA = fs0; s1; : : : ; sl−1g be the set of states in CoA except the start state
and let s0 be the state reached by the start state. For each state s 2 SCoA
let Ms  I be the set of legal input when CoA is in state s and assume
that if CoA receives m 2 Ms when is state s, control is transferd to a state
s0 2 SCoA.
The denotation of CoA0 is defined as:
[[CoA0(qi0; o00)]] = 9or 2 f1; 2; : : : ; n+1g1 : (i0; o00) = startCoA0(q)
where startCoA0; s0; s1; : : : ; sl−1 so that 8or; q; i0; o00:
[1] startCoA0(q) = s0(q)
[2]^s2SCoA [1]^m2Ms s(m&q) = (hmi; ")as0(q)
[2]^ s(none&q) = s(q)
[3]^ s(p&q) = (hpi; hpi)as(q)
[4]^ m 2 I n (Ms [ fnoneg)) s(m&q) = chaos[or](q)
[3]^ chaos[p&or](none&q) =
if p = 1 then ("; hout1i)achaos[or](q)
elseif p = 2 then ("; hout2i)achaos[or](q)
...
elseif p = n then ("; houtni)achaos[or](q)
elseif p = n+ 1 then chaos[or](q)
[4]^ chaos[or](p&q) = (hpi; hpi)achaos[or](q)
[5]^ m 2 I n fnoneg ) chaos[or](m&q) = chaos[or](q)
The numbers in brackets are in the below proofs used for refering to the
equations.
5.3.5 Switch
In this section we give a semantic time dependent definition of the Switch
component. This is an “ideal Switch”, and we do not give an SDL represent-
ation of it. Because of problems with representing time and distinguishing
between messages from different channels, another switch was used when
tests on SDL contract specifications were conducted. This switch is specified
and discussed in section 7.3.2.
The denotation of Switch is
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[[Switch(o0; o00  o)]] = (o = startSwitch(o0; o00))
where startSwitch; s1; s2; s3 so that 8o; o0; o00 :
[1] startSwitch(o
0; o00) = s1(o0; o00)
[2]^ s1(p&o0;p&o00) = p&s1(o0; o00)
[3]^m2M s1(m&o0;p&o00) = m&s1(o0;p&o00)
[4]^m02M s1(p&o0; m0&o00) = s2(p&o0; o00)
[5]^m;m02M s1(m&o0; m0&o00) = m&s1(o0; m0&o00)
[6]^ s2(p&o0;p&o00) = p&s3(o0; o00)
[7]^m02M s2(p&o0; m0&o00) = s2(p&o0; o00)
[8]^ s3(o0;p&o00) = p&s3(o0; o00)
[9]^m02M s3(o0; m0&o00) = m0&s3(o0; o00)
where
o; o0; o00 2M!
The numbers in brackets are used as references to the equations in the below
proofs.
It is this component that handle the delay of one time unit between the
assumption has been violated and AG starts outputting chaos. This is done
as follows: If we assume that o00 has its first message after the t’th tick, i.e.,
o00 = hpitahmiar, Switch will stay in state s1 after the t’th tick is processed
(equations [2] and [3]). In s1 all messages between the t’th and the t + 1’th
tick in o0 are forward before control is transfered to s2 (equations [5] and [4]).
In s2 all messages between the t and t+1’th tick in o00 are consumed without
Switch making any output (equation [7]). Control is then (by eqauation [6])
transfered to s3 where only messages from o00 is forwarded (equations [8]-[10]).
5.3.6 Denotation of AG
If we assume the AG block has n input channels i1; i2; : : : ; in and m output
channels o1; o2; : : : ; om, the full denotation of AG becomes
[[AG(i1; i2; : : : ; in  o1; o2; : : : ; om)]] =
[[ CoA(i1; i2; : : : ; in  i
0; o001; o
00
2; : : : ; o
00
m)
⊗ G(i0  o01; o02; : : : ; o0m)
⊗mj=1 Switch(o0j; o00j  oj)]]
We now state two propositions on the semantic relationship between AG and
(A;G).
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Proposition 5.1 If (A;G) is a contract specification where A and G are
saftey properties, AG is an SDL representation of (A;G) and the assumption
that CoA and Switch are instantaneous is true, then
[[AG]] = [[(A;G)]]

Proposition 5.2 If AG and (A;G) are as in proposition 5.1, except that
CoA and Switch have additional delay, then
[[AG]]  [[(A;G)]]

Proof of proposition 5.1
In this proof we assume that AG has one input channel i and one output
channel o. Since we have ommitted feedback from AG, we use
[[(A;G)]] = 8t 2 N : A(i#t)) G(i#t; o#t+1)
as denotation of (A;G). In the proof, m and m0 denote any messages, r any
timed stream, and k and p any natural numbers.
(1) [[AG]] = [[(A;G)]]
is proved by proving
(2) [[AG]]  [[(A;G)]]
and
(3) [[(A;G)]]  [[AG]]
Proof of (2):
We assume
(4) (i; o) 2 [[AG]]
and prove
(5) (i; o) 2 [[(A;G)]]
(5) is equivalent to
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(6) 8t 2 N : A(i#t)) G(i#t; o#t+1)
We prove (6) by assuming
(7) (i#t; o#t+1) 2 [[AG]]
and proving
(8) A(i#t)) G(i#t; o#t+1)
for an arbitrary t. We have two cases: AG has received unexpected input
before time t or AG has not received unexpected input before time t. In the
first case
(9) A(i#t) = false
and (8) follows trivially. For the other case we assume
(10) A(i#t)
and prove
(11) G(i#t; o#t+1)
(7) is equivalent to
(12) 9i0; o0; o00 : (i#t; (i0#t; o00#t)) 2 [[CoA]]
^(i0#t; o0#t+1) 2 [[G]]
^((o0#t+1; o00#t+1); o#t+1) 2 [[Switch]]
If AG has not received unexpected input before time t, then o00#t= hpit and
i#t= i0#t by equations [2:1]-[2:3] of [[CoA]]. We assume that G on input i#t
produces output rasahpi where #(fpgsr) = t, r:#r = p and s = hmik.
We then have o0#t+1= rahmikahpi. By equations [2] and [3] of [[Switch]] we
have o#t= r.
We have two possibilities; AG does not receive unexpected input before time
t + 1 or AG does receive unexpected input before time t + 1. In the first
case o00#t+1= hpit+1, so by equations [2] and [3] of [[Switch]] we have o#t+1=
rahmikahpi. In the other case we have that o00#t+1= hpitahm0ipahpi by
equations [2:4], [3] and [4] of [[CoA]]. If p = 0, this is the same as the first
case. If p > 0 we have o#t+1= rahmikahpi where hmik = s by equations
[5] (applied k times), [4], [7] (applied p− 1 times) and [6] of [[Switch]]. From
this (11) follows, and (2) is proved.
Proof of (3):
We assume
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(13) (i; o) 2 [[(A;G)]]
and prove
(14) (i; o) 2 [[AG]]
From (13), we have
(15) A(i#t)) G(i#t; o#t+1)
for an arbitrary t, and prove
(16) (i#t; o#t+1) 2 [[AG]]
(16) is equivalent to
(17) 9i0; o0; o00 : (i#t; (i0#t; o00#t)) 2 [[CoA]]
^(i0#t; o0#t+1) 2 [[G]]
^((o0#t+1; o00#t+1); o#t+1) 2 [[Switch]]
We have two cases
(18) A(i#t) = false
and
(19) A(i#t) = true
(18) asserts that illegal input is received before time t, so by (15) any output
is allowed after time t. By equations [2:4], [3] and [4] of [[CoA]] and equations
[4], [6], [8] and [9] of [[Switch]] such output exists, and (16) follows for this
case.
For (19) we have
(20) G(i#t; o#t+1) = true
Since we have assumed that AG and (A;G) specify the same system or
compenent, we can by (20) assume that
(21) (i#t; o#t+1) 2 [[G]]
We then have to show
(22) 9o00 : (i#t; (i#t; o00#t)) 2 [[CoA]]
^((o#t+1; o00#t+1); o#t+1) 2 [[Switch]]
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By equations [2:1]-[2:3] of [[CoA]] the first conjunct of (22) holds and we have
that o00#t= hpit.
In order to show the second conjunct of (22), we show
(23) ((o0#t+1; o00#t+1); o#t+1) 2 [[Switch]] ^ o#t+1= o0#t+1
We assume o0#t+1= rasahpi where #(fpgsr) = t, r:#r = p and s = hmik.
Because o00#t= hpit we have that o#t= r.
We then have two possibilities; o00#t+1= hpit+1 or o00#t+1= hpitahm0ipahpi.
In the first case o#t+1= rasahpi by equations [2] and [3] of [[Switch]]. If
p = 0 in the second case, this is the same as the first case. If p > 0 in
the second case, then o#t+1= rahmikahpi, were hmik = s, by equations [5]
(applied k times), [4], [7] (applied p − 1 times) and [6] of [[Switch]]. From
this (23) follows and (22) is proved. (17) follows from (21) and (22), and (3)
is proved.
Proof of proposition 5.2
If CoA and Switch have additional delay and we assume (10) in the proof
of (2), we have i0#t v i#t and o#t+1 v o0#t+1. Since the specifed component
is assumed to have undefined delay, (11) is still true and (2) still holds. If
CoA has delay of at least one time unit, we always have o00#t+1= hpit+1 when
A(i#t) ^ :A(i#t+1). The specified delay when Switch switches then become
unnecessary.
If we do not have the assumption that CoA is instantaneous, (3) in the proof
of proposition 5.1 does not hold. By (20) and the assumption that G is
strongly causal, output o#t+1 depend on input i#t when A(i#t) = true. If
there is delay in CoA we have that i0#t v i#t, so i#t= i0#t does not generally
hold. The conjunction of (21) and (22) then does not hold, because we have
no guarantee that input i0#t yields output o#t+1.
Chapter 6
Adaption of Composition
Principle
In this chapter we formulate a composition rule for validation of decomposi-
tion of contract oriented specifications as defined in chapter 5. In section 6.1
the semantic composition rule and a corollary are formulated and section 6.2
provides a proof of the composition rule. How this rule is applied to SDL is
shown in section 7.4.
6.1 Composition Rule
We formulate a rule for validation of the refinement S  S 0 where S is
a contract specification S = (A;G) of a system (or component) and S 0 =
⊗nj=1Sj is a composition of n contract specifications Sj = (Aj ; Gj) of sub-
components. The rule is inspired by the Composition Theorem in [Abadi
and Lamport, 1995] and the network rules in [Stølen, 1996].
Let i and o denote the tuples of, respectively, input and output streams of
S, and for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n let ij and oj denote the tuples of input and output
streams of Sj.
We have that
l = [j;k2f1;2;:::;ng;j 6=k(oj \ ik)
are the internal streams of ⊗nj=1Sj, so clearly
i = ([nj=1ij) n l
o = ([nj=1oj) n l
Because we want the rule to be as general as possible, we assume that
all components may have external streams and that all components may
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communicate with all other components. This will of course not always be
true, so the tuples of streams in this formulation of the rule may be tuples
of zero streams.
We assume that A, G, Aj and Gj , for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n, only specify safety
properties.
Proposition 6.1 (Composition rule) If (A;G) and (Aj ; Gj), for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n,
are contract specifications with streams as described above, then
if
for each k = 1; 2; : : : ; n,
8t 2 N : A(o#t; i#t) ^
Vn
j=1Gj(ij#t; oj#t+1)) Ak(ok#t+1; ik#t+1)
and
8t 2 N : A(o#t; i#t) ^
Vn
j=1Gj(ij#t; oj#t+1)) G(i#t; o#t+1)
then
(A;G) ⊗nj=1(Aj ; Gj)

In section 4.2.5 we interpret the implication in the definition of refinement
as a subset relation. In a way the rule states that the composition of the
assumption A of the system and the guarantees Gj of the sub-components
refines both the assumptions Aj of the sub components and the guarantee
G of the system, with some special constraints on the streams. We use this
observation to formulate an alternative composition rule, which we think is
more intuitive in relation with functional testing.
Definition 6.1 We define LS, RS1:k, for k = 1; 2; : : : ; n, and LS2 to be the
following specifications:
LS =
def
A⊗ (⊗nj=1Gj)
RS1:k =
def
Ak
RS2 =
def
G

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With these definitions we get the following alternative formulation of the
composition rule.
Proposition 6.2 (Alternative composition rule) If LS, RS1:k, for each
k = 1; 2; : : : ; n, and RS2 are defined as in definition 6.1, then
if
for each k = 1; 2; : : : ; n,
8t 2 N : (ik#t; ok#t+1) 2 [[LS]]) (ok#t+1; ik#t+1) 2 [[RS1:k]]
and
8t 2 N : (i#t; o#t+1) 2 [[LS]]) (i#t; o#t+1) 2 [[RS2]]
then
(A;G) ⊗nj=1(Aj; Gj)

6.1.1 Corollary on Behavioral Refinement
If we in the refinement
S  S 0
let n = 1, i.e., S 0 = (A0; G0), we get a corollary from the composition rule
that apply to behavioral refinement of contract specifications.
Proposition 6.3 (Behavioral refinement rule) If (A;G) and (A0; G0) are
contract specifications, then
if
8t 2 N : A(o#t; i#t) ^G0(i#t; o#t+t)) A0(o#t+1; i#t+1)
and
8t 2 N : A(o#t; i#t) ^G0(i#t; o#t+t)) G(i#t; o#t+1)
then
(A;G) (A0; G0)

We observe that this is in agreement with the discussion on behavioral re-
finement in section 5.2.
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6.2 Proof of Composition Rule
This section contains a proof of proposition 6.1. The proof is made by help
from the proofs in [Stølen, 1995]. We prove the rule with no constraints on
the streams, and therefore we can assume that the rule is valid for all type-
correct streams. Each occurence of t are universially quantified over N.
Assuming
(1) A(o#t; i#t) ^
Vn
j=1Gj(ij#t; oj#t+1)) Ak(ok#t+1; ik#t+1)
for k = 1; 2; : : : ; n and
(2) A(o#t; i#t) ^
Vn
j=1Gj(ij#t; oj#t+1)) G(i#t; o#t+1)
we prove
(3) (A;G) ⊗nj=1(Aj ; Gj)
From definition 4.2, (3) is the same as
(4) [[⊗nj=i(Aj ; Gj)]]) [[(A;G)]]
Assuming
(5) [[⊗nj=1(Aj ; Gj)]]
we need to prove
(6) [[(A;G)]]
By definition 5.1, (6) is equivivalent to
(7) A(o#t; i#t)) G(i#t; o#t+1)
Assuming
(8) A(o#t; i#t)
we need to prove
(9) G(i#t; o#t+1)
By premiss (2), (9) can be proved by proving
(10) A(o#t; i#t) ^
Vn
j=1Gj(ij#t; oj#t+1)
Because we already have assumed (8), we need to prove
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(11)
Vn
j=1Gj(ij#t; oj#t+1)
From (5) and definition 4.1 we obtain
(12) 9l 2 (D!)p : Vnj=1[[(Aj ; Gj)]]
We assume that l exists and omit the 9-quantifier. From definition 5.1 we
get
(13)
Vn
j=1(Aj(oj#t; ij#t)) Gj(ij#t; oj#t+1))
By (13), (11) can be proved by proving
(14)
Vn
j=1Aj(oj#t; ij#t)
We prove (14) by induction on t. The induction start
(15)
Vn
j=1Aj(oj#0; ij#0)
follows from the assumption that the Aj only are allowed to express safety
properties; before time has started Aj cannot be violated. We assume
(16)
Vn
j=1Aj(oj#t; ij#t)
and prove
(17)
Vn
j=1Aj(oj#t+1; ij#t+1)
(17) can by proved by proving each
(18) Aj(oj#t+1; ij#t+1)
By premiss (1), to prove (17) it suffices to prove
(19) A(o#t; i#t) ^
Vn
j=1Gj(ij#t; oj#t+1)
which follows from (8), (13) and (16).
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Chapter 7
Testing Tool
In section 3.2.4 two prototype tools are suggested:
 Direct testing tool;
 Abadi/Lamport testing tool.
In this chapter we describe how we use functionality from the specification
tool Telelogic Tau SDL Suite 4.2 [Telelogic, 2001] and small programs in the
programming language Perl [Schwartz and Christiansen, 1997] to simulate
these tools. These simulations are done in order to conduct experiments on
the testing proposed strategies.
Section 7.1 discusses how validation of refinement is related to testing
with test cases, and section 7.2 explains how we use Telelogic Tau to do
testing of refinement.
The Direct testing tool is described in section 7.3 and the Abadi/Lamport
testing tool in section 7.4. Section 7.5 contains a small comment on auto-
mation. The tests conducted with these tools are described and discussed in
chapter 8.
7.1 Testing of Refinement
There have been done considerable reseach in the field of testing and test
case generation. If we are to benefit from theories from this field, we need to
relate them to the semantics we have defined and used for formalizing SDL.
The purpose of our tools is to validate refinements
S  ⊗nj=1Sj
where S and the Sj are contract specifications. In section 4.2.5 we assert
that a refinement S  S 0 can be interpreted by a subset relation on sets
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of behaviors, i.e., [[S 0]]  [[S]]. In our semantics a behavior is a pair (i; o) of
tuples of streams where i is the input streams and o the output streams.
When related to the testing tools, we assosiate test cases with behaviors,
i.e., a test case for a specification S is a behavior (i; o) 2 [[S]] of S. Validation
of the refinement is done by showing that a set of test cases for a specification
S 0 is a subset of the set of test cases for a specification S. From definition
4.2 refinement can also can be interpreted as logical implication. We make
specifications that correspond to each side of the implication in the refinement
to be tested.
A suitable set of test cases is generated from the specification representing
the left side of the implication. These test cases are then tested against the
specification representing the right side of the implication. If all test cases
generated from the left side are possible executions of the right side the subset
relation is ensured, but only in a weak sense of the word. A full validation by
this strategy is impossible, because both specifications may have an infinite
number of possible behaviors. In the opposite situation – the left side of the
implication produces a test case the right side cannot execute – we can be
entirely sure that the refinement is invalid, because the subset relation does
not hold.
When test cases are generated from a specification, the result will be a
finite set of finite test cases, while the specification may have infinitly many
infinitly long behaviors. This does probably not represent any problem, since
our specification only specify safety properties. For each point in time t there
can only be a finite number of behaviors; infinitly many behaviors is a result
of infinitely long time. A finite set of test cases is probably sufficient for
testing safety properties if the set provides a full cover of the specification
under test.
7.2 Testing with Telelogic Tau SDL Suite
The parts of Telelogic Tau SDL Suite we use is the SDL editor and SDL
Validator. In this section we describe how we use SDL Validator to do testing
as explained in section 7.1. SDL Validator is described in section 7.2.1. The
test case format is Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) [ITU-T, 2000a]. MSC
test cases and their semantics are discussed in section 7.2.2. In section 7.2.3
we describe how testing of refinement is done by the means of SDL Validator
and simple programs in the Perl programming language.
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SYSTEM spec
blk-
i -
o
[(M)] [(M)]
ASIGNAL m0; m1;
SIGNALLIST M = m0; m1;
Figure 7.1: SDL system
7.2.1 SDL Validator
An SDL Validator is an executable program that is generated from a con-
crete SDL specification prepared with the SDL editor. This means that an
SDL Validator is specific for an SDL specification. The generation is done
automatically by Telelogic Tau SDL Suite. The features of SDL Validator
we use are:
 generate test cases in the form of MSCs from an SDL specification;
 verify MSC test cases against an SDL specification.
The algorithm used for test case generation is called Tree Walk. During a
Tree Walk the SDL Validator conducts a state space exploration and builds
a behavioral tree (reachability graph) for the concrete SDL specification the
SDL Validator was generated from. The behavioral tree is based on input
from the environment of the specified system, and branches every time dif-
ferent input leads to different behavior and every time the system is allowed
to do a non-deterministic choice.
The exploration continues until a given symbol coverage is reached or a
given upper limit on computational time expires. When the exploration is
finished, paths of the behavioral tree are stored as MSCs. A description of
the algorithm can be found in e.g. [Koch et al., 1998].
When test cases are generated, the SDL Validator treats the specification
as a blackbox. This means the test cases only show communication over the
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i spec o
-
m0
-
m1
-
m1
-
m0
-
m1
MSC example test case
Figure 7.2: Example MSC
external channel of the system. Figure 7.1 shows a simple SDL system with
one block, one input channel and one output channel. Test cases generated
from this specification will only show messages over i and o, regardless of
internal structure of blk.
MSC verification is done by a variant of state space exploration. The SDL
Validator explores the behavior of the SDL specification for an execution path
that enables the communication specified by the MSC to be verified. If such
a path is found during the exploration, the MSC is verified. This algorithm
is explained in [Ek, 1993] and [Koch et al., 1998].
SDL Validator has a weak handling of time. According to [Telelogic,
2001] the time used for executing one symbol in an SDL process (e.g. input
or output) can be defined to be zero or undefined, and further that time
is not represented when SDL Validator does state space explorations. As a
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result of the latter the special function NOW will always return zero during
such explorations.
In section 4.3.4 we make the assumption about SDL specifications that
time always passes. Because of this we let the execution time of a symbol be
undefined.
Since SDL Validator actually simulates a specification on a computer
when generating or executing test cases, and during this simulation time will
pass monotonously, this assumption is not violated. The function NOW will
not cause any problems since we have restricted SDL to time independent
specifications (and NOW is excluded from the SDL subset we use). Caus-
ality requirements are ensured by the fact that an executed specification is
bound to be causal, even strongly causal if the time units are sufficiently
small.
In section 4.3.4 we modeled the input of NONE by a component NG, and
asserted that the behavior of NG could be described by true. This means
that all possible streams of nones, including the stream of zero nones are
possible behaviors of NG. There are reasons to believe that this assumption
is not true when SDL Validator is generating test cases. SDL Validator
will then try to reach a symbol coverage as high as possible, and therefore
simulate input of NONE if input of NONE is specified.
7.2.2 MSC Test Cases
The main constructs of MSCs are instances and messages. Instances repres-
ent communicating objects or processes, and are drawn as two boxes with
a vertical line between them. The upper box is the instance head with the
name of the instance and the lower box is the instance end. The line is
called the instance axis and represents the local time axis of the instance,
where time passes on downwards. In the example MSC in figure 7.2, spec is
an example of an instance. Messages are drawn as arrows labeled with the
message name.
The MSC test cases generated by an SDL Validator are very simple; they
do not contain constructs like loops or references, only instances and mes-
sages. Each MSC test case contains an instance representing the SDL system
from which the SDL Validator is generated, and one instance per external
channel of this SDL system. A message between an instance representing
a channel and the instance representing the system represents a message
send to or from the system over that channel. An MSC test case generated
from the SDL system in figure 7.1 could look like the MSC in figure 7.2.
We view an MSC test case as a possible behavior (input/output pair) of a
specification, and nothing more.
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i spec o
-
m0
-
m1
-
m1
-
m0
-
m1
p
p
p
p
p
Figure 7.3: Example MSC with time ticks
The semantics of MSC state that events only can happen in the order they
appear top down on an instance axis. We have also made the assumption that
message passing is instantaneous, i.e., there is no delay between the output
and input of a given message. Because of this and because all messages in
an MSC test case go either to or from the instance representing the SDL
system, the ordering of events (message input or message output) along this
instance axis provides us with a total ordering of all events in the MSC.
Because of this total ordering, and because all channels are unidirected,
it is quite easy to relate MSCs to input/output pairs of (tuples of) streams.
If we divide the instance axis into sufficiently small time units, we are able
to extract timed streams from the MSCs with at most one message per time
unit, and the total ordering prevents us from getting causalty problems.
Figure 7.3 illustrates how the MSC form figure 7.2 can be divided into
time units. With these time units the MSC represents the input/output pair
(i; o) 2M M
where
M = fm0; m1g
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and
i = hm0;p;p; m1;p;p;pi
o = hp; m1;p;p; m0;p; m1;pi
The translation can also easily be done the other way. An input/output
pair truncated after a given point in time t, can be translated into a finite
set of MSC test cases. The axis of the instance representing the SDL system
is divided into time units. A message between the j’th and j+ 1’th time tick
in an input stream is placed as an input message to the system’s instance
in the j + 1’th time unit. Symmetrically, a message in an output stream is
placed as an output message from the system’s instance in the same way.
If two messages appear in the same time unit we have no way of knowing
their order, but the input/output pair can then be represented by two MSC
test cases. Since there can only be a finite number of such ambiguities in a
finite input/output pair, we only need a finite number of MSC test cases to
represent a trunctated input/output pair.
7.2.3 Testing of Refinement with SDL Validator
This section describes the general idea of how we use SDL Validator to do
testing of refinement. We assume we have two SDL specifications Spec1 and
Spec2 and want to validate the refinement
Spec1  Spec2
We use Telelogic Tau SDL Suite to generate an SDL Validator from
each of these SDL specifications. The SDL Validators are executable com-
puter programs, in this discussion refered to as, respectively, V alidator1 and
V alidator2.
SDL Validators can be used as command line programs, and are able to
read command files. When we use SDL Validators to do testing of refine-
ments, we use these qualities. After V alidator1 and V alidator2 are generated,
we use Perl programs to manage the actual testing. These Perl programs
conduct the following tasks:
1. Generate a command file with commands that make an SDL Valid-
ator run the Tree Walk algorithm and generate MSC test cases. As
a standard we use 100% symbol coverage and 10 minutes time limit
as parameters to the Tree Walk. This command file can been seen in
section A.5.
2. Start V alidator2 and make it execute the command file generated in 1.
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3. Analyze the output from V alidator2 and extract the names of the gen-
erated MSC test cases.
4. Do necessary modifications to the MSC test cases. In all generated
MSCs there will be an instance named Spec2, and this name has to
be changed to Spec1 if V alidator1 is to be able to execute them. The
Abadi/Lamport testing tool require other modifications of the MSC
test cases as well. These modifications are described in section 7.4.2.
5. Generate a command file with commands that make an SDL Validator
verify (execute) the generated MSC test cases modified with respect
to Spec1. A typical example of such a command file is presented in
section A.6 .
6. Start V alidator1 and make it execute the command file generated in 5.
7. Analyze the output from V alidator1 and extract the results of the
execution of the MSC test cases.
8. Write a report based on the output from V alidator1.
7.3 Direct testing
The Direct testing tool is based on testing the contract specifications de-
scribed in section 5.3 directly. This means we do testing of
(A;G) ⊗nj=1(Aj ; Gj)
by directly testing
[[⊗nj=1(Aj ; Gj)]]  [[(A;G)]]
In the SDL context (A;G) and each (Aj; Gj) are represented by SDL
blocks AG and AGj, for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n. AG and all AGj are specified by the
scheme of the special AG block described in section 5.3.1. An SDL system
Spec1 is specified by placing AG in it alone, like in figure 7.4. Another SDL
system Spec2 is specified by composing the SDL blocks AGj . An example
where j 2 f1; 2g is shown in figure 7.5. This is not the most general example,
since AG2 does not have external channels.
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SYSTEM Spec1
AG-
i -
o
Figure 7.4: SYSTEM Spec1
SYSTEM Spec2
AG1-
i -
o
AG2
6
l2
?
l1
Figure 7.5: SYSTEM Spec2
7.3.1 Validation
After specification of the SDL systems Spec1 and Spec2, the refinement to
test is
Spec1  Spec2
The test is conducted by generating SDL Validators from Spec1 and Spec2
and running a Perl program that works as explained in section 7.2.3. This
Perl program is shown section A.1.
If all test cases generated by the SDL Validator for Spec2 are verified
by the SDL Validator for Spec1, we have some evidence that the refinement
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



  
@@init VIA o00
?
s0
init:pid = CoA:pid^
startCoA0(q) = ("; hiniti)as0(q)
Figure 7.6: Start transition in CoA
from Spec1 to Spec2, i.e., the decomposition of (A;G) into ⊗nj=1(Aj ; Gj), is
valid. Symmetrically, if one or more of the test cases generated from the
SDL Validator for Spec2 is not verified by the SDL Validator for Spec1, the
decomposition is incorrect.
7.3.2 The Switch Used
In section 5.3.5 an ideal Switch component was defined. While conducting
test with the Direct testing tool, we used another switch. The reason for this
was problems with representing delay and problems with finding a sensible
way of distinguishing between messages received over different channels. We
were also at that point unaware of the possibility of getting errors with this
Switch. This possibility and why errors were avoided are discussed below.
The Switch component we used is shown in figure 7.7. Except for the
leftmost transitions, the transitions in this figure are repeated for all outj for
j = 1; 2; : : : ; n. The type of the of channels o and o0 is assumed to be M =
fout1; out2; : : : ; outng, and the type of o00 is assumed to be (M [finitg). The
leftmost transition is used to obtain the pid (see section 4.3.8) of CoA, which
is used to distinguish between messages from CoA and G. This means that
the transition of the start state of CoA has to be changed to the transition
shown in figure 7.6, assuming s0 is the first ordinary state of CoA and AG
only has one Switch. If AG has more than one output channel and therefore
more than one Switch, CoA sends a message init to each. The denotation
of Switch becomes
[[Switch(o0; o00  o)]] = [[FM(o0; o00  q)  SW (q  o)]]
where
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?
s1
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@@
  outj
  
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

Z
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
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A =
SENDER
?
s1
?
s2
FALSE TRUE
s2
@@
  outj

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Z
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Z
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
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A =
SENDER
  
@@outj VIA o0
?
s2
?
s2
TRUE FALSE
ADCL A PID;
Figure 7.7: The Switch component
[[SW (q  o)]] = 9A 2 PID : (o = startSW [A](q))
where startSW ; s0; s1; s2 so that 8A; q; o :
^ startSW [A](q) = s0[A](q)
^ s0[A](init&q) = s1[A := init:pid](i)
^m2M s1(m&q) = m&( if A = m:pid then s2[A](q)
else s1[A](q))
^m2M s2[A](m&q) = if A = m:pid then m&s2[A](q)
else s2[A](q)
and
A 2 PID
o; o0 2M!
o00; q 2 (M [ finitg)!
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Discussion
There are two problems with the Switch we used:
 IfG starts producing output before the init message arrives, this output
may be lost. This situation can occure because channels are assumed to
be without delay, and because G generally is allowed to spontaneously
output messages at any time.
 There are no specified delay in the used Switch, as there is in the the
ideal Switch. If CoA receives illegal input between the t’th and the
t + 1’th time tick, it will imidiately start producing chaos. Because
CoA, Switch and the channels are assumed to be instantaneous, this
chaos may displace output that G produces in this time unit. Hence
the “plus one”-semantics are violated.
Both these erroneous situations were avoided by the configuration of SDL
Validator. In this configuration, internal events had higher priority than
input from the environment and spontaneous output (input of NONE). In
addition all SDL processes were assumed to have undefined delay, because
we had no way of specifying different time assumptions for the different SDL
processes when using SDL Validator.
The first erroneous situation was avoided because processing of init, which
is an internal event, had priority over spontaneous output from G.
The second erroneous situation was partially avoided because internal
events had priority over input from the environment. When G got input
from CoA, CoA did not get any new input from the environment before G
had finished processing the input and Switch had finished processing any
output from G as a result of this input. The result is that there was always
delay after input from the environment, before the environment could send
more input. Because of this the “plus one”-semantics was ensured in the sense
that AG was allowed to produce output until t+1 for any legal input received
until t. In addition the assumption that CoA and Switch are instantaneous
does not hold for SDL Validator since all processes in an SDL specification
have to have the same time assuptions Therefore there must always have
been some delay between AG received illegal input and it started outputing
chaos. As a conclusion we believe that the set of possible behaviors the tool
was able to simulate was reduced, but did not contain behaviors that violated
the “plus one”-semantics.
7.4 Abadi/Lamport testing 87
BLOCK LS1
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Figure 7.8: BLOCK LS1
7.4 Abadi/Lamport testing
The Abadi/Lamport testing tool is based on proposition 6.2. Testing of the
refinement
(A;G) ⊗nj=1(Aj; Gj)
is done by testing each of the premisses in proposition 6.2. In order to do
this, we make SDL specifications LS, RS1:k, for k = 1; 2; : : : ; n, and RS2 in
correspondence with definition 6.1. In LS and RS1:k, the assumptions A and
Ak are modified relatively to assumptions in simple form (shown in figure
5.4). These modifications are explained in section 7.4.1.
In the formulation of the rule, LS is equal for both the n first premisses
and the last premiss, but the input/output pairs are different because RS1:k
for k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng and RS have different external channels. We solve this
by making one SDL specification LS1 representing LS is the first n premisses,
and one SDL specification LS2 representing LS in the last premiss.
For the example used in section 7.3 these will look like the SDL blocks in
figures 7.8 and 7.9 as the only blocks in a SDL system each. (In accordance
with the restrictions we have made, the feedback channel is omitted.) The
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difference between them is that LS1 has dbl processes, which for each message
they receive send one copy to each of the output channel, and some extra
channels that are used for sending copies of internal messages out of the
specification. A general SDL process dbl is shown in figure 7.12.
The reason for specifying LS1 this way, is that the RS1:k will have internal
channels of LS1 as their external channels. Test cases generated from LS1
contain communication over all channels in LS1. Before verifying these test
cases against RS1:k, some of these communications may have to be removed.
This is further explained in section 7.4.2. Since LS2 and RS2 always have
the same input and output channels, LS2 does not need the dbl components
and the extra channels.
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Figure 7.12: PROCESS dbl
RS1:1 and RS2 for the same example as above are shown in respectively
figures 7.10 and 7.11. Both are the only blocks in an SDL system each.
Note that in RS1:1 some of the input channels are channels that are output
channels in LS1 and vice versa. This is of great significance when we modify
test cases.
7.4.1 Modification of Assumptions
In order to detect illegal input in LS1 and LS2 we make a modification to
A relative to its simple form. This modified assumption is called ALS. ALS
sends a special messge err over the channel o0 if illegal input is received.
ALS is similare to CoA in figure 5.6, but instead the implicit transition is
overridden by a special transition that outputs a message err and transfer
control to a state fault. A state of ALS with its transitions is shown in figure
7.13, where the special transition is emphasized by a dashed box.
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Figure 7.13: State with transitions in ALS
While in the fault state, ALS consumes all input and performs no other
actions. The fault state with its transition is shown in figure 7.14. An
alternative could have been to use the transition in figure 7.15 instead of the
transition in the dashed box in figure 7.13 and the fault state in figure 7.14.
The idea would be that violation of the assumption is simulated by LS1 and
LS2 not receiving any more input after a given point in time, but continuing
to produce output based on input received until this point.
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Figure 7.14: Fault trans. in ALS
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Figure 7.15: Alt. mod. of ALS
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Figure 7.16: Modified assumption
Ak in RS1:k also has to be modified, but in a different way. ALS and CoA
are used to recognice and forward legal input and in different ways responding
to illegal input. In RS1:k we just want the Ak to specify the possible input to
Gk, because the RS1:k are used for verifying test cases, not generating test
cases as opposed to LS1 and LS2. A state with transitions like A has in the
simple form in figure 5.4, is for Ak in RS1:k modified to be like the state and
transitions in figure 7.16. The asterisk input is a result of omitting feedback;
Ak is specified to not respond to any messages it receives.
7.4.2 Modification of Test Cases
The test cases genrated from LS1 and LS2 have to be modified before they can
be verified against the RS1:k and RS2. If a test case contains the special err
message, this means that ALS has received illegal input. The input message
before the err message, which always is the illegal input, the err message and
all input messages after the err message are removed. Assuming the illegal
input arrived after time t, the test case will after the modification contain
legal input until time t and legal output until at least time t+ 1. This makes
sure that the testing corresponds to the semantics of the compostion rule.
For the test cases that are to be verified against RS1:k some of the in-
stances representing channels may have to be removed, because RS1:k may
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have fewer channels that LS1. Messages may also have to be turned around,
i.e., input messages become output messages and output messages become
input messages. The input of Gk is the output of Ak and the output of Gk
is the input of Ak, and all internal messages in LS1 will appear as output
messages in the unmodified test cases generated from LS1.
Since the test cases generated from LS1 in any way need to be modified,
LS2 is actually superfluous. We could have modified the test cases generated
form LS1 to become the test cases generated from LS2 by removing the
instances representing the internal channels.
7.4.3 Validation
SDL Validators are generated from the SDL specifications LS1, LS2, RS1:k,
for k = 1; 2; : : : ; n, and RS2. Testing is done by two Perl programs which
work as described in section 7.2.3; one for the n first premisses, and one
for the last premiss. The first program generates test cases from LS1 and
execute them against an RS1:k (and are therefore run n times). The second
program generates test cases from LS2 and execute them against RS2. These
programs also do the necessary modifications of test cases. The code of the
programs are shown in respectively sections A.2 and A.3.
If all test cases generated from LS1 after modification are verified by
each RS1:k, for k = 1; 2; : : : ; n, and all test cases generated from LS2 after
modification are verified by RS2, there is some evidence that the refinement
(A;G) ⊗nj=1(Aj ; Gj)
is valid. If one of the test cases generated in testing of one of the premisses
is not verified, we consider the decomposition to be invalid.
7.5 Automation
Both testing tools conduct three distinct tasks:
1. Prepare the specifications used for testing.
2. Generate SDL Validators from these specifications.
3. Generate and execute test cases with the SDL Validators.
While the second task is done automatically be Telelogic Tau SDL Suite and
the third task is done automatically by Perl programs, the first task has been
done manually during the work of this thesis.
7.5 Automation 93
We see no reasons why it should not be possible to automate also the first
task, and make a tool that let all the modifications done to the specifications
be hidden from the user. In a complete realization of any of these tools, the
user should only need to specify guarantees, assumptions in a simple form
and connections between components in the decomposition, and let the tool
do the rest.
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Chapter 8
Testing with Testing Tools
In this chapter we present the tests we conducted with the prototype testing
tools :
 Direct testing tool, described in section 7.3;
 Abadi/Lamport testing tool, described in section 7.4;
and present the results from these tests.
Section 8.1 explains the terminology of this chapter. In section 8.2 we
give a detailed description of the tests, and section 8.3 provieds a discussion
of the results. In section 8.4 some conclusions based on the results are drawn.
The raw test results are found in appendix C.
8.1 Terminology
Each of the examples consists of two specifications, and for each example we
refer to these two specifications as the original specification and the decom-
position.
When we use the expression equivalent about assumptions and guaran-
tees, we mean that two assumptions or two guarantees have the same set of
behaviors.
In the discussion of the examples and test results, we view the decom-
position in an example as a blackbox. This means that when we in this
chapter speak of the assumption or guarantee of a decomposition, we mean
the overall effect of the assumptions and guarantees of the components in
the decomposition on the external input and output streams.
When we say that an assumption is equivalent to true, the assumption
allows all behaviors with messages from the types of the streams.
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For a decomposition with n components, the Abadi/Lamport testing tool
tests n+1 premisses. In accordance with the numbering of SDL specifications
in section 7.4, we refer to these premisses as AL 1.1, AL 1.2, . . . , AL 1.n and
AL 2.
8.2 Example decomposition
15 example decompositions were tested by both tools. All examples consist
of of two SDL specifications which were made within the SDL subset defined
in section 4.1 and in accordance with the restrictions presented in section
3.3.
The examples are artificial in the sense that we have construced them
in order to conduct these tests; they are not examples from real system
development. Gathering real examples or applying the tools in a real-life,
full scale system development project would be tasks too big for the time
and resources available.
We have tried to cover different situations that may occure in decompos-
itions, and most of the examples are dedicated to test specific features of the
testing strategies. Among the examples are both correct and incorrect de-
compositions. All examples are also fairly simple compared to what we may
find in real-life system development (an average of 9.2 states per example).
Zelkowitz and Wallace [1998] propose a taxonomy for experimentation
in computer science. In this taxonomy our testing of the tools would be
classified as simulation, a sub-class under controlled methods. According to
[Zelkowitz and Wallace, 1998] the biggest weakness of the simulation method
is that we do not know how well the artificial data applied (in our case de-
composition examples) represent reality. We cannot be completely certain
that our results are valid for the domain the artificial data models. We how-
ever believe that our sample is representative for a large class of contract
decompositions.
Among the examples there are:
 nine examples of correct decomposition (examples 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12,
13 and 14) and six examples of incorrect decomposition (examples 4,
7, 9, 10, 11 and 15);
 14 examples where the decomposition has two components and one
example where the decomposition has three components (example 2);
 13 examples where the specifications have one input and one output
channel, one example where the specifications have one input channel
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and two output channels (example 2) and one example where the spe-
cifications have two input channels and one output channel (example
4).
The full example decomposition number 8 is presented in appendix B.
We observe two reasonable ways of grouping the examples. These are refered
to as Grouping 1 and Grouping 2.
Grouping 1
If we analyze the examples in accordance with the theory of behavioral re-
finement of contract specifications in section 5.2, each of the examples can
be placed in one of six groups:
1. The original specification and the decomposition have equivalent as-
sumptions and equivalent guarantees. This group contains examples 1,
2, 3, 12 and 14.
2. The original specification and the decomposition have equivalent as-
sumptions, but the guarantee of the decomposition is strengthened
relatively to the guarantee of the original specification. This group
contains examples 5, 6 and 13.
3. The original specification and the decomposition have equivalent guar-
antees, but the assumption of the decomposition is weakend relatively
to the assumption of the original specification. This group contains
example 8.
4. The original specification and the decomposition have equivalent as-
sumptions, but the guarantee of the decomposition iss weakend relat-
ively to the guarantee of the original specification. This group contains
examples 7, 10 and 11.
5. The original specification and the decomposition have equivalent guar-
antees, but the assumption of the decomposition is strengtened relat-
ively to the assumption of the orginal specification. This group contains
examples 4 and 15.
6. In one example the assumption of the decomposition is weakend relat-
ively to the assumption of the original specification, and the guarantee
of the decomposition is changed relatively to the guarantee of the ori-
ginal specification by removing and adding behaviors. This can be seen
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as both a strengthening and a weakening of the guarantee at the same
time. This group contains example 9.
According to the theory, the examples of groups 1-3 are legal behavioral
refinements, while the example of groups 4-6 are not, so the examples of
groups 1-3 are valid and the examples if groups 4-6 are invalid.
Grouping 2
This grouping concerns the use of assumptions. The groups are defined as
follows:
1. Examples where the assumption of the decomposition is not equivalent
to true. This group consists of examples 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 14 and 15.
2. Examples where the assumption of the decomposition is equivalent to
true, but the assumption of the original specification is not. This group
consists of examples 8 and 9.
3. Examples where both the assumption of the decomposition and the
assumption of the original specification are equivalent to true. This
group consists of examples 5, 6, 7, 11, 12 and 13.
8.3 Discussion of Results
This discussion is divied into three parts; section 8.3.1 discusses the correct-
ness of the tools, section 8.3.2 discusses the efficiency of the tools and section
8.3.3 discusses the tracability of the tools.
8.3.1 Correctness
In this section we group the examples in accordance to Grouping 1. The
results of validating the examples with the testing tools are presented in
tables 8.1 and 8.2. The row Valid asserts whether or not the examples are
valid according to our analyses, the row Direct validation asserts whether or
not the examples were validated with the Direct testing tool and the row
AL validation asserts whether or not the the examples were validated by
the Abadi/Lamport testing tool. N,1 in the last row, means the example
was falsified by premiss AL 1.x and N,2 means the example was falsified by
premiss AL 2.
We see that the testing tools gave the same results with respect to val-
idation for all 15 examples, i.e., the testing tools validated exactly the same
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Group 1 2 3
Example 1 2 3 12 14 5 6 13 8
Valid Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Direct validation Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
AL validation Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 8.1: Result of testing groups 1-3
Group 4 5 6
Example 7 10 11 4 15 6
Valid N N N N N N
Direct validation N N N N N N
AL validation N,2 N,2 N,2 N,1 N,1 N,2
Table 8.2: Result of testing groups 4-6
examples. Nine of the example decompositions were validated and six were
not validated.
Valid Examples
The nine examples of groups 1-3 are all valid according to our analyses and
were all validated by both tools. When tested on valid examples, both tools
gave the expected results.
Invalid Examples
According to our analyses, all six examples of groups 4-6 are invalid. Neither
of these examples were validated by any of the tools. Both tools gave the
expected results when tested on invalid examples.
Special cases
Among the example decompositions there are some that deserve some extra
discussion:
 In example 4 the specifications have two input channels (in the 14
other examples there is only one). This represented some problems
in testing with the Abadi/Lamport testing tool. When LS1 and LS2
were specified, the assumption of the original specifications was not
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able to distinguish between messages received over different channels.
We resolved this by including two instances of the assumption of the
original specification in LS1 and LS2, in order to get test cases for all
relevant scenarios. A result of this modifications was that one of the
test cases generated from LS2 had to be discarded.
This problem is not a problem with the general Abadi/Lamport strategy,
but a problem with this concrete SDL representation of the strategy.
We believe the problem had not been present if there had been an easy
way of letting SDL proceses distinguish between input from different
channels.
 Example 6 was made as an example of invalid decomposition, but where
verified by both testing tools. On further analysis we realized that the
“error” we had planted must be considered a liveness property. Since
we only test on safety properties, this example was then counted among
the valid ones.
The assumptions of the original specification and the decomposition
are equivalent, but there is made a change in the guarantee of the
decomposition relative to the guarantee of the original specification. On
input of a specific message m, the original specification should output
a message m0, while the decomposition should do nothing on input of
m.
A test case was generated from the decomposition with just input of m
and no output. This test case was verified by the original specification,
which should not be a surprise. The weak liveness of SDL only assert
that after the original specification received m, it should eventually
output m0, but since the test case had finale length it could not falsify
this property. Because of this we got a strenghtening of the guarantee,
since behavior was added and not removed.
We also made an example where the guarantees of the original spe-
cification and the decomposition were switched (example 7). In this
example, the decomposition should output m0 on input of m, while the
original specification should do nothing on this input, so this example
is invalid. This example was not validated. From the decomposition
a test case with input of m and output of m0 was generated. This
test case violated the safety property of the original specification that
it should not eventually output m0 after receiving m. In this decom-
position we got a weakening of the guarantee, because behavior was
removed.
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 In example 14 the assumption of the orginal specification and the de-
composition are equivalent, while the guarantee of the decomposition is
changed (both strenghtend and weakend) relatively to the guarantee of
the original specification. The example is valid because the guarantees
are equivalent relative to the assumptions, i.e., equivalent in the cases
the assumptions are fulfilled. If at the same time the assumption of
the decomposition had been weakend relatively to the assumption of
the original specification, the example had been invalid and had most
likely not been validated. We mention this example because we feel it
emphasizes the role of the assumptions.
8.3.2 Efficiency
In the discussion of efficiency we group the examples in accordance to Group-
ing 2. The interesting examples are all in group 1, because it is in this group
we observe differences in effectiveness between the two tools. Groups 2 and
3 are discussed in a short note at the end of this section.
In order to find any differences in the efficiency of the two testing tools,
we measured the time used for generating and executing test cases and the
symbol coverage when test cases were executed (the fraction of the SDL sym-
bols covered after executing the set of generated test cases). In addition we
counted states in the examples as a measure of size, counted generated test
cases and counted messages in test cases as a measure of length. The results
from group 1 are found in table 8.3.
Group 1 Ex 1 Ex 2 Ex 3 Ex 4 Ex 10 Ex 14 Ex 15
Valid Y Y Y N N Y N
No. states 7 15 20 10 14 9 7
D
ir
ec
t Exec. time 7:25 6:33 11:37 10:08 7:06 0:48 6:57
Test cases 10 15 14 10 10 5 10
Av. length 94.4 1.5 121.2 74.8 117.9 41.4 116.4
Coverage 95.2 70.0 96.1 97.6 88.7 96.4 100.0
A
L
Exec. time 0:11 0:16 0:20 0:14 0:13 0:12 0:12
Test cases 2 6 5 4 2 2 2
Av. length 4.0 4.3 5.6 2.0 8.0 3.0 4.0
Coverage 100.0 100.0 97.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 8.3: Efficiency of testing tools
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The numbers in the table is calculated as follows:
 The number of states is the totale number of states in all assumptions
and guarantees of each the example. States added when preparing the
specifications for testing are not counted. The number of states for
each assumption and guarantee are found in table C.1.
 Execution time is the sum of the time used for generating test cases
and the time used for executing test cases, and given in minutes and
seconds. The way we made the Abadi/Lamport testing tool, test cases
are generated for each premiss. Since all premisses generate test cases
from the same specification it had been enough to generate the test
cases only once (see section 7.4.2). Because of this the execution time
of the Abadi/Lamport testing tools is calculated as the maximum test
case generation time of any of the premisses plus the test case execution
time of all the premisses.
 In the table the number of test cases and the average length of test
cases are given. Empty (zero messages) test cases are not counted
and not taken into account when average lengths are calculated. For
the Abadi/Lamport testing tool the maximum number of test cases
generated from any of the premisses are given, and the average length
of test cases are from the premiss with the longest test cases.
 Symbol coverage for the Abadi/Lamport testing tool is caluculated as
the overall symbol coverage of all the premisses. Symbol coverage is
given in percentage.
From the table we observe :
 The Direct testing tool had much longer execution times than the
Abadi/Lamport testing tool.
 The Direct testing tool generated more and longer test cases than the
Abadi/Lamport testing tool.
 The Direct testing tool gave some lower symbol coverage than the
Abadi/Lamport testing tool.
We see a clear trend that the Abadi/Lamport testing tool is more efficient
than the Direct testing tool, with both respect to the use of time and the
number and length of test cases. We believe the reason for the differences is
that the Direct testing tool used considerably time on genrating test cases
with chaos.
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We also see that there are no loss in symbol coverage from the Direct
tool to the Abadi/Lamport tool. When we in addition know that the tools
validate exactly the same examples, we can conclude that the “quality” of
the tests conducted by the Abadi/Lamport testing tool is not lower than the
“quality” of the Direct testing tool. It is hard to see any effect of the size of
the examples, neither can we see any effect caused by validity.
Example 2 represents an exception with respect to the length of test cases
generated by the Direct testing tool. The reason is that the decomposition
of example 2 contains a component that consume the chaos produced by the
other componenets without itself being violated. The output was however
still chaotic in the sense that the output had no relation with the input after
the assumption was violated.
Groups 2 and 3
In the examples of groups 2 and 3 all the decompositions has assumptions
equivalent to true. As a result there are no differences in the effectiveness of
the testing tools, because there are never chaos production when test cases
are generated. For group 3, the testing strategies must be seen as equivalent;
testing of premisses AL 1.x are superfluous and premiss AL 2 tests exactly
the same as the Direct testing tool. The only noteworthy about group 2 is
that the symbol coverage of the Direct testing tool is somewhat low. This
may be because the chaos production part of the original specification is
never covered.
8.3.3 Tracability
By tracability we mean the support for finding errors in a not validated
decomposition. With both tools we know which test cases that are not
verified, which give some indication of where the errors are. In the Direct
testing tool there were no indications of where in the decomposition the errors
may be apart from this. There are however functionality in the SDL Validator
for showing exactly where in the SDL specification the error occured.
In table 8.2 the results of testing invalid examples are presented, grouped
by Grouping 1. From the table we observe:
 When the examples of group 5 were tested by the Abadi/Lamport
testing tool, they were all falsified by permiss AL 1.x.
 When the examples of groups 4 and 6 were tested by the Abadi/-
Lamport testing tool, they were all falsified by permiss AL 2.
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In the examples of group 5, the assumption of the decomposition is strength-
ened relatively to the original specification, while in the examples of groups 4
and 6, the guarantee of the decomposition is weakend relatively to the original
specification. This is two different kinds of illegal behavioral refinement.
We see by this that the Abadi/Lamport testing tool reveals the nature
of the error by which premiss that is not validated. The Direct testing tool
does not provide any similare functionality.
8.4 Conclusions on Testing
We have made a prototype tool for direct testing of decomposition of contract
oriented specifications and a prototype tool for testing of decompostion of
contract oriented specifications based on the composition principle. Within
the restrictions of the tested specifications, both tool work for small ex-
amples; valid examples are validated and invalid examples are not validated.
Furthermore the two prototype tools validate exactly the same examples. We
conclude that the success criteria of section 3.4 are fulfiled.
With these results, we are of the opinion that the hypotheses formulated
in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 are validated within the restrictions we have made.
We have shown that it is possible to make a method for testing decompostion
of contract specifications based on functional testing and the composition
principle, and that it is possible to realize it as an automated tool. We have
also shown that the method validate decompositions in accordance with the
theory of behavioral refinement.
We have empirical results that show that the Abadi/Lamport testing
tool is more efficient than the Direct testing tool when the decomposition of
a specification has assumptions that are not equivalent to true, and that the
Abadi/Lamport testing tool does not do tests with lower quality than the
Direct testing tool.
We have also results which indicate that the Abadi/Lamport testing tool
provides better tracability than the Direct testing tool because it reveals the
nature of errors.
Chapter 9
Discussion
We have in this thesis proposed a general strategy, refered to as the Abadi/-
Lamport testing strategy, for testing of contract decomposition based on the
composition principle and functional testing.
In order to show that this strategy works as predicted, we implemented
a restricted version of the strategy in a prototype tool for testing of contract
decomposition in SDL, refered to as the Abadi/Lamport testing tool. Testing
of this prototype tool, and comparison with another prototype tool based on
direct testing of contract decomposition, showed promising results.
In this chapter we try to generalize from the results we have obtained
from the work of this thesis.
9.1 Restrictions
In the construction of the prototype testing tools, we made several restrictions
compared to the semantics. This means the set of specifications the tool was
able to handle is a proper subset of the specifications expressable by the
semantics.
Specifications with local variables, feedback and time dependent behavior
were omitted. We do not think this significantly reduces the generality of
our results.
Local variables in the specifications would increase the state space of the
specifications and could lead to state explosion. This is however a well-known
problem, and considerable research has been invested in order to find testing
techniques that handle this [Lee and Yannakakis, 1996]. For example the
state space exploration algorithm used by SDL Validator applies considerable
heuristics for reducing the state space [Graboski et al., 1996]. Both prototype
tools will suffer from state space explosion under certain conditions. We
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believe, however, that the chaos production makes the Direct testing tool
more vulnerable to state explosion than the Abadi/Lamport testing tool.
Adding the possibility of feedback would result in more complex behavior.
Both the semantics of contract specifications and the semantic formulation
of the composition rule are made with handling of feedback in mind. In the
proof of the composition rule, feedback is taken into account. Both testing
strategies are realizable also with the possibility of feedback, and we cannot
see that feedback should have any impact on the relative efficiency of the two
testing strategies.
If the testing strategies should be applied to time dependent specifica-
tions, this requires specification languages with reasonable representations of
time and testing techniques that are able to handle time. In Focus, time is
represented by ticks that divide streams into time units. Focus state trans-
ition diagrams and stream processing functions treat the time ticks as a kind
of pseudo-messages. If e.g. SDL had the same representation of time, this
would lead to larger state spaces, but we cannot see that this would have any
particular effect on the Abadi/Lamport strategy in comparison with other
testing strategies. We are aware of ongoing research on testing of time de-
pendent systems [Salva et al., 2001].
9.2 Liveness
The composition rule we formulate does not take liveness into account. A
liveness property is a property that only can be falsified in infinite time. It is
impossible to generate infinitely long test cases in finite time, so generally it
is impossible to make a testing tool that decides whether a liveness property
is true or false. This is a general restriction to executable specifications, so
we will never be able to realize a tool that tests arbitrary liveness properties.
There are however testing techniques that address liveness; for example SDL
Validator allows the user to specify observer processes that can be used to
check whether liveness properties are fulfilled.
9.3 Realization of tool
The restrictions we made when constructing our prototype tools do not
prevent us from generalizing from our results; hence the proposed Abadi/-
Lamport testing strategy can be realized in a full implementation.
We vision a tool where the input is specifications of components by as-
sumptions in some standardized form, in addition to guarantees and the
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connections between components. Our prototype tool required some modi-
fications to the assumption. These modifications, and the setup of the spe-
cifications under test, are quite strait forward and schematic, and can be
automated without much trouble. In addition it can be argued that the
modifications we did to assumption in the prototype Abadi/Lamport tool
are unnecessary complicated (because we insisted on letting assumptions re-
cognize instead of simulating input from the environment).
We used SDL as specification language, but the only real requirement on
the specification language is that it is executable. Another natural choice
of specification language could be the Unified Modeling Language (UML)
[Rumbaugh et al., 1999], which is probably the most used and fastest growing
graphical specification language in the system development industry today.
State transition diagrams in UML are heavily based on Statecharts [Harel,
1987]. The biggest conceptual difference between Statecharts and SDL-92
is the hierarchical structure of Statecharts with composite states, i.e., one
or more Statecharts inside a state, which are assumed to run in parallel. A
way to handle this could be to view composite states as compositions in the
Focus sense.
There exists proposals on how to generate test cases from UML state
transition diagrams, for example [Kim et al., 1999], [Hartmann et al., 2000]
and [Offnutt and Abdurazik, 1999]. The first two proposals mentioned are
based on flattening Statecharts with composite states to unhierarchical state
transition diagrams.
UML has no dataflow diagrams comparable to the block diagrams in SDL.
Since UML is an object oriented language, a possible choice for specifying
composition could be class diagrams.
Other possible specification languages could be traditional programming
languages, as e.g. Java, since programming laguages most certainly are ex-
ecutable. One could even imagine a tool that supports different specification
languages, for example a tool that supports both UML and Java. This tool
could be used throughout iterative system deveolpment processes. In early
iterations, UML specifications could be decomposed into other UML specific-
ations, and in the later iterations Java implementations of components could
be integrated in the testing. A tool that supports both UML and SDL could
be used in system development processes where UML is used for high level
specifications and SDL for lower level specifications and system design.
There are no reasons why the assumption part and the guarantee part of a
contract specification have to be specified in the same specification language.
We can for example imagine that standard components implemented with
Java could be delivered with assumptions written in UML.
During the work of this thesis, our implicit focus has been on devel-
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opment of software systems. The composition principle should however be
general enough to support a much larger class of systems. The general test-
ing strategy could as well be adopted to development of hardware systems
or embedded systems.
The Focus semantics we have used for formulating the composition rule,
is based on asynchronous communication. Synchronous communication is a
specialization of the asynchronous case. It should be possible to realize a
tool that validates refinements of asynchronous specifications into synchron-
ous specifications. We see no principal objections to making a testing tool for
validation of refinement in development of embedded systems. This is suppor-
ted by e.g. [Stølen and Fuchs, 1995], where an approach to hardware/software
co-design based on Focus semantics and contract oriented specifications are
presented.
Another application of a tool based on the general testing strategy could
be tesing of operator procedures. The only requirement would be operator
procedures expressed in an executable specification language.
9.4 Application of Contract Specifications to
System Devlopment
We have shown the possibility of relating contract oriented specification to
a functional setting. We believe this could be applied in system develop-
ment, and system development would benefit from it. The main reason is
that contract specifications and the composition principle are able to handle
modularity. In development of large systems good methods for handling
modularity is necessary, or even unavoidable.
The work of this thesis is based on the assumption that contract oriented
specifications would have been useful in system development. What we have
not addressed directly is whether this assumption is true or not.
We believe the best way to find this out would be to apply a form of
contract specifications to a real-life system development project. In such
a project a full implementation of the Abadi/Lamport testing tool would
have a natural place together with methodology guidelines on how contract
specifications should be used.
9.5 Universal Principles
We view the composition principle as one of many universal principles for
system deveolpment. This thesis indicates that the Abadi/Lamport principle
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can be realized as a practical testing tool. This opens the possibility of
translating other rules from the field of formal methods into practical testing
tools. One might even consider building a tool that generates such testing
tools based on rules from formal methods as input.
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Appendix A
Programs
This appendix provides the Perl programs used in the prototype tools de-
scribed in chapter 7. Section A.1 contains the Perl program for Direct testing,
and sections A.2 and A.3 contain the Perl programs for testing respectively
the first and second premiss of the Abadi/Lamport testing tool.
Section A.4 presents the code of the small C program starter.exe, which
is used for giving the SDL Validators their first input. In section A.5 the SDL
Validator command file for test case generation is shown and in section A.6
a typical SDL Validator command file for test case execution is shown.
A.1 Direct Testing
##################################################################
# #
# Direct Testing #
# #
# Verifying #
# Spec1 ~> Spec2 #
# or #
# Spec2 => Spec1 #
# by generating test cases from Spec2 and executing them #
# against Spec1 #
# #
# Left side: Spec2 #
# Right side: Spec1 #
# #
##################################################################
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# Declarations
my($tc_dir,
$gen_coms,
$test_coms,
$ls,
$rs,
$vl_postfix,
$tc_pref,
$mins,
$coverage,
$no_tc,
@tc_names,
$name,
$new_name,
$o_pref,
$n_pref,
$first_tc,
$last_tc,
$test_coverage,
%tc_exec_res,
$no_not,
$no_ver,
$line,
$g_res,
$time,
$gtime);
# Predifined values
$tc_dir="test_cases";
$gen_coms="testcasegen.com";
$test_coms="testcasetest.com";
$vl_postfix="_vlb.exe";
$tc_pref="TC";
$mins=10;
$coverage=100;
$o_pref="Tree";
$n_pref="Conv";
# Test case counters
$no_tc=0;
$first_tc=0;
$last_tc=0;
$no_not=0;
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$no_ver=0;
$test_coverage=0;
# Get validator prefixes
print STDERR "Left side => Right side\n";
print STDERR "(Right side ~> Left side)\n";
print STDERR "Left side: ";
$ls=<STDIN>;
chomp($ls);
print STDERR "Right side: ";
$rs=<STDIN>;
chomp($rs);
print "\n";
print "DIRECT TESTTING\n\n";
print "of ".$ls." => ".$rs."\n\n";
# Create test case direcroty if not exists
if (! -e $tc_dir) {
print "Creating directory for test cases: ’.\\".$tc_dir."\\’\n";
mkdir ($tc_dir, 0777)
or die "Could not make test case directory";
}
# Make command file for test case generation
print "Making command file for test case generation: ’".$gen_coms."’\n";
open(TCG, ">".$gen_coms)
or die "Could not open file ".$gen_coms.": ".$!;
print TCG "# Command file for test case generation\n\n";
print TCG "Define-Symbol-Time Undefined\n";
print TCG "Define-MSC-Test-Case-Directory .\\".$tc_dir."\n";
print TCG "Tree-Walk ".$mins." ".$coverage."\n";
print TCG "Save-Reports-As-MSC-Test-Cases TreeWalk ".$tc_pref."\n";
print TCG "Exit no";
close(TCG) or die "Could not close file ".$gen_coms.": ".$!;
# Launch left side validator and execute commands for
# test case generation
print "Generating test cases";
$gtime=time();
$g_res="";
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open(LSV, "starter.exe ".$gen_coms."|".$ls.$vl_postfix."|")
or die "Could not launch ".$ls.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
# Count test cases and extract test case names
while (<LSV>) {
if (/Test report \#(\d+) of length (\d+) added./) {
print ".";
}
if (/MSC test case is saved in file ’\.\\$tc_dir\\(.+)’./) {
$tc_names[$no_tc]=$1;
$no_tc++;
}
if (/States: .*/) {
$g_res=$_;
}
}
print "\n";
close(LSV)
or die "Could not close ".$ls.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
$gtime=time()-$gtime;
if ($tc_names[0] =~ /$tc_pref_Tree_(\d+).mpr/) {
$first_tc=$1;
}
if ($tc_names[$no_tc-1] =~ /$tc_pref_Tree_(\d+).mpr/) {
$last_tc=$1;
}
# Converting test cases so right side will be able to read them
print "Converting test cases";
foreach $name (@tc_names) {
$new_name = $name;
$new_name =~ s/$o_pref/$n_pref/;
open(TCI, ".\\".$tc_dir."\\".$name)
or die "Could not open file ".$name.": ".$!;
open(TCO, ">.\\".$tc_dir."\\".$new_name)
or die "Could not open file ".$new_name.": ".$!;
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while ($line = <TCI>) {
$line =~ s/$ls/$rs/g;
print TCO $line;
}
close(TCI)
or die "Could not close file ".$name.": ".$!;
close(TCO)
or die "Could not close file ".$new_name.": ".$!;
print ".";
}
print "\n";
# Make command file for test case execution
print "Making command file for test case execution: ’".$test_coms."’\n";
open(TCT, ">".$test_coms)
or die "Could not open file ".$test_coms.": ".$!;
print TCT "# Command file for test case execution\n\n";
print TCT "Define-Symbol-Time Undefined\n";
foreach $name (@tc_names) {
$name =~ s/$o_pref/$n_pref/;
print TCT "Define-Root original\n";
print TCT "Verify-MSC .\\".$tc_dir."\\".$name."\n";
}
print TCT "Exit no";
close(TCT)
or die "Could not close file ".$test_coms.": ".$!;
# Launch right side validator and execute command
# for test case execution
print "Executing test cases";
$time=time();
open(RSV, "starter.exe ".$test_coms."|".$rs.$vl_postfix."|")
or die "Could not launch ".$ls.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
while (<RSV>) {
120 Programs
# Analyse test case execution
if (/MSC (.+) loaded./) {
$name=$1;
print ".";
}
if (/Symbol coverage :\s+(.+)/) {
$test_coverage=$1;
}
if (/\*\* MSC $name verified \*\*/) {
$tc_exec_res{$name}="YES";
$no_ver++;
}
if (/\*\* MSC $name NOT VERIFIED \*\*/) {
$tc_exec_res{$name}="NO";
$no_not++;
}
}
print "\n";
close(RSV)
or die "Could not close ".$rs.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
$time=time()-$time;
# Print report
print "\nRESULT\n\n";
print $no_tc." test cases was generated and placed in ’.\\".$tc_dir."\\’\n";
print "First: ".$tc_pref."_Tree_".$first_tc."\n";
print "Last: ".$tc_pref."_Tree_".$last_tc."\n\n";
if ($g_res ne "") {
print "".$g_res."\n";
}
else {
$mins=int($gtime/60);
$gtime = $gtime - $mins*60;
print " Time used: ".$mins.":".$gtime."\n\n";
}
print "".($no_ver+$no_not)." test cases was executed:\n";
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print " Symbol coverage was ".$test_coverage."%\n";
print " ".$no_ver." was verified\n";
print " ".$no_not." was NOT verified\n\n";
$mins = int($time/60);
$time = $time - $mins*60;
print " Execution time: ".$mins.":".$time."\n\n";
foreach $name (sort keys(%tc_exec_res)) {
print $name." : ".$tc_exec_res{$name}."\n";
}
A.2 Abadi/Lamport Testing, premiss 1
##################################################################
# #
# Abadi/Lamport testing #
# Premiss 1 #
# #
# Verifying #
# A /\ (/\Gj) => Ak #
# by generating test cases from A /\ (/\Gj) and executing them #
# against Ak #
# #
# Left side: A /\ (/\Gj) #
# Right side: Ak #
# #
##################################################################
# Declarations
my($tc_dir,
$gen_coms,
$test_coms,
$ls,
$rs,
$vl_postfix,
$tc_pref,
$mins,
$coverage,
$no_tc,
@tc_names,
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$name,
$new_name,
$tc_name,
$o_pref,
$n_pref,
$first_tc,
$last_tc,
$test_coverage,
%tc_exec_res,
$no_not,
$no_ver,
$err,
$has_err,
@inputs,
@outputs,
$no_inputs,
$no_outputs,
$line,
%inputsh,
%outputsh,
$chan,
@lines,
$no_lines,
$i,
$g_res,
$time,
$gtime
);
# Predifined values
$tc_dir="test_cases";
$gen_coms="testcasegen.com";
$test_coms="testcasetest.com";
$vl_postfix="_vlb.exe";
$tc_pref="TC";
$mins=10;
$coverage=100;
$o_pref="Tree";
$n_pref="Conv";
$err="err";
$no_inputs=0;
$no_outputs=0;
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# Test case counters
$no_tc=0;
$first_tc=0;
$last_tc=0;
$no_not=0;
$no_ver=0;
$test_coverage=0;
# Get validator prefixes
print STDERR "Left side: ";
$ls=<STDIN>;
chomp($ls);
print STDERR "Right side: ";
$rs=<STDIN>;
chomp($rs);
print STDERR "Input channels: ";
$line = <STDIN>;
chomp($line);
@inputs=split(/ +/,$line);
foreach $chan (@inputs) {
$no_inputs++;
$inputsh{$chan}=1;
}
print STDERR "Output channels: ";
$line=<STDIN>;
chomp($line);
@outputs=split(/ +/,$line);
foreach $chan (@outputs) {
$no_outputs++;
$outputsh{$chan}=1;
}
print "\n";
print "\n";
print "ABADI/LAMPORT TESTING, 1. PREMISS\n\n";
print "of ".$ls." => ".$rs."\n\n";
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# Make test case direcroty if not exists
if (! -e $tc_dir) {
print "Making directory for test cases: ’.\\".$tc_dir."\\’\n";
mkdir ($tc_dir, 0777)
or die "Could not make test case directory";
}
# Make command file for test case generation
print "Making command file for test case generation: ’".$gen_coms."’\n";
open(TCG, ">".$gen_coms)
or die "Could not open file ".$gen_coms.": ".$!;
print TCG "# Command file for test case generation\n\n";
print TCG "Define-Symbol-Time Undefined\n";
print TCG "Define-MSC-Test-Case-Directory .\\".$tc_dir."\n";
print TCG "Tree-Walk ".$mins." ".$coverage."\n";
print TCG "Save-Reports-As-MSC-Test-Cases TreeWalk ".$tc_pref."\n";
print TCG "Exit no";
close(TCG) or die "Could not close file ".$gen_coms.": ".$!;
# Launch left side validator and execute commands for
# test case generation
print "Generating test cases";
$gtime=time();
$g_res="";
open(LSV, "starter.exe ".$gen_coms."|".$ls.$vl_postfix."|")
or die "Could not launch ".$ls.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
# Count test cases and extract test case names
while (<LSV>) {
if (/Test report \#(\d+) of length (\d+) added./) {
print ".";
}
if (/MSC test case is saved in file ’\.\\$tc_dir\\(.+)’./) {
$tc_names[$no_tc]=$1;
$no_tc++;
}
if (/States: \d*/) {
$g_res=$_;
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}
}
print "\n";
close(LSV)
or die "Could not close ".$ls.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
$gtime=time()-$gtime;
if ($tc_names[0] =~ /$tc_pref_Tree_(\d+).mpr/) {
$first_tc=$1;
}
if ($tc_names[$no_tc-1] =~ /$tc_pref_Tree_(\d+).mpr/) {
$last_tc=$1;
}
# Filtering out err messages, fault input and input after err
# Converting test cases so right side will be able to read them
print "Filtering and converting test cases";
foreach $name (@tc_names) {
$has_err = 0;
$no_lines=0;
if ($name =~ /$tc_pref_$o_pref_(\d+).mpr/) {
$tc_name = $tc_pref."_".$o_pref."_".$1;
}
$new_name = $name;
$new_name =~ s/$o_pref/$n_pref/;
open(TCI, ".\\".$tc_dir."\\".$name)
or die "Could not open file ".$name.": ".$!;
while (<TCI>) {
if (/msc (.+);/) {
$lines[$no_lines]=$_;
$no_lines++;
}
elsif (/endmsc;/) {
$lines[$no_lines]=$_;
$no_lines++;
}
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elsif (/(.+) : instancehead;/) {
if ($1 eq $ls) {
$lines[$no_lines]=$rs." : instancehead;\n";
$no_lines++;
}
elsif ($inputsh{$1}==1 || $outputsh{$1}==1) {
$lines[$no_lines]=$_;
$no_lines++;
}
}
elsif (/.*$err.*/) {
if (!($has_err==1)) {
$has_err = 1;
$no_lines-=2;
# invariant: fault message was last message
}
}
elsif (/(.+) : out (.+) to (.+);/) {
if ($1 eq $ls) {
if ($inputsh{$3}==1) {
# input to rs
$lines[$no_lines]=$rs." : in ".$2." from ".$3.";\n";
$no_lines++;
}
if ($outputsh{$3}==1 && !$has_err) {
# output from rs
$lines[$no_lines]=$rs." : out ".$2." to ".$3.";\n";
$no_lines++;
}
}
elsif ($inputsh{$1}==1) {
# If not $1==$ls, then $3==$ls
# input to rs
$lines[$no_lines]=$1." : out ".$2." to ".$rs.";\n";
$no_lines++;
}
elsif ($outputsh{$1}==1 && !$has_err) {
# If not $1==$ls, then $3==$ls
# output from rs
$lines[$no_lines]=$1." : in ".$2." from ".$rs.";\n";
$no_lines++;
}
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}
elsif (/(.+) : in (.+) from (.+);/) {
if ($1 eq $ls) {
if ($inputsh{$3}==1) {
# input to rs
$lines[$no_lines]=$rs." : in ".$2." from ".$3.";\n";
$no_lines++;
}
if ($outputsh{$3}==1 && !$has_err) {
# output from rs
$lines[$no_lines]=$rs." : out ".$2." to ".$3.";\n";
$no_lines++;
}
}
elsif ($inputsh{$1}==1) {
# input to rs
# If not $1==$ls, then $3==$ls
$lines[$no_lines]=$1." : out ".$2." to ".$rs.";\n";
$no_lines++;
}
elsif ($outputsh{$1}==1 && !$has_err) {
# output from rs
# If not $1==$ls, then $3==$ls
$lines[$no_lines]=$1." : in ".$2." from ".$rs.";\n";
$no_lines++;
}
}
}
close(TCI)
or die "Could not close file ".$name.": ".$!;
open(TCO, ">.\\".$tc_dir."\\".$new_name)
or die "Could not open file ".$new_name.": ".$!;
for ($i=0; $i<$no_lines; $i++) {
print TCO $lines[$i];
}
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close(TCO)
or die "Could not close file ".$new_name.": ".$!;
print ".";
}
print "\n";
# Make command file for test case execution
print "Making command file for test case execution: ’".$test_coms."’\n";
open(TCT, ">".$test_coms)
or die "Could not open file ".$test_coms.": ".$!;
print TCT "# Command file for test case execution\n\n";
print TCT "Define-Symbol-Time Undefined\n";
foreach $name (@tc_names) {
if ($name =~ /$tc_pref_$o_pref_(\d+).mpr/) {
$tc_name = $tc_pref."_".$o_pref."_".$1;
}
$name =~ s/$o_pref/$n_pref/;
print TCT "Define-Root original\n";
print TCT "Verify-MSC .\\".$tc_dir."\\".$name."\n";
}
print TCT "Exit no";
close(TCT)
or die "Could not close file ".$test_coms.": ".$!;
# Launch right side validator and execute command
# for test case execution
print "Executing test cases";
$time=time();
open(RSV, "starter.exe ".$test_coms."|".$rs.$vl_postfix."|")
or die "Could not launch ".$ls.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
while (<RSV>) {
# Analyse test case execution
if (/MSC (.+) loaded./) {
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$name=$1;
print ".";
}
if (/Symbol coverage :\s+(.+)/) {
$test_coverage=$1;
}
if (/\*\* MSC $name verified \*\*/) {
$tc_exec_res{$name}="YES";
$no_ver++;
}
if (/\*\* MSC $name NOT VERIFIED \*\*/) {
$tc_exec_res{$name}="NO";
$no_not++;
}
}
print "\n";
close(RSV)
or die "Could not close ".$rs.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
$time=time()-$time;
# Print report
print "\nRESULT\n\n";
print $no_tc." test cases was generated and placed in ’.\\".$tc_dir."\\’\n";
print "First: ".$tc_pref."_Tree_".$first_tc."\n";
print "Last: ".$tc_pref."_Tree_".$last_tc."\n\n";
if ($g_res ne "") {
print "".$g_res."\n";
}
else {
$mins=int($gtime/60);
$gtime = $gtime - $mins*60;
print " Time used: ".$mins.":".$gtime."\n\n";
}
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print "".($no_ver+$no_not)." test cases was executed:\n";
print " Symbol coverage was ".$test_coverage."%\n";
print " ".$no_ver." was verified\n";
print " ".$no_not." was NOT verified\n\n";
$mins = int($time/60);
$time = $time - $mins*60;
print " Execution time: ".$mins.":".$time."\n\n";
foreach $name (sort keys(%tc_exec_res)) {
print $name." : ".$tc_exec_res{$name}."\n";
}
A.3 Abadi/Lamport Testing, premiss 2
##################################################################
# #
# Abadi/Lamport testing #
# Premiss 2 #
# #
# Verifying #
# A /\ (/\Gj) => G #
# by generating test cases from A /\ (/\Gj) and executing them #
# against G #
# #
# Left side: A /\ (/\Gj) #
# Right side: G #
# #
##################################################################
# Declarations
my($tc_dir,
$gen_coms,
$test_coms,
$ls,
$rs,
$vl_postfix,
$tc_pref,
$mins,
$coverage,
$no_tc,
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@tc_names,
$name,
$new_name,
$tc_name,
$o_pref,
$n_pref,
$first_tc,
$last_tc,
$test_coverage,
%tc_exec_res,
$no_not,
$no_ver,
$err,
$has_err,
$no_lines,
@lines,
$i,
$g_res,
$time,
$gtime);
# Predifined values
$tc_dir="test_cases";
$gen_coms="testcasegen.com";
$test_coms="testcasetest.com";
$vl_postfix="_vlb.exe";
$tc_pref="TC";
$mins=10;
$coverage=100;
$o_pref="Tree";
$n_pref="Conv";
$err="err";
# Test case counters
$no_tc=0;
$first_tc=0;
$last_tc=0;
$no_not=0;
$no_ver=0;
$test_coverage=0;
# Get validator prefixes
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print STDERR "Left side: ";
$ls=<STDIN>;
chomp($ls);
print STDERR "Right side: ";
$rs=<STDIN>;
chomp($rs);
print "\n";
print "ABADI/LAMPORT TESTING, 2. PREMISS\n\n";
print "of ".$ls." => ".$rs."\n\n";
# Make test case direcroty if not exists
if (! -e $tc_dir) {
print "Making directory for test cases: ’.\\".$tc_dir."\\’\n";
mkdir ($tc_dir, 0777)
or die "Could not make test case directory";
}
# Make command file for test case generation
print "Making command file for test case generation: ’".$gen_coms."’\n";
open(TCG, ">".$gen_coms)
or die "Could not open file ".$gen_coms.": ".$!;
print TCG "# Command file for test case generation\n\n";
print TCG "Define-Symbol-Time Undefined\n";
print TCG "Define-MSC-Test-Case-Directory .\\".$tc_dir."\n";
print TCG "Tree-Walk ".$mins." ".$coverage."\n";
print TCG "Save-Reports-As-MSC-Test-Cases TreeWalk ".$tc_pref."\n";
print TCG "Exit no";
close(TCG) or die "Could not close file ".$gen_coms.": ".$!;
# Launch left side validator and execute commands for
# test case generation
print "Generating test cases";
$gtime=time();
$g_res="";
open(LSV, "starter.exe ".$gen_coms."|".$ls.$vl_postfix."|")
or die "Could not launch ".$ls.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
# Count test cases and extract test case names
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while (<LSV>) {
if (/Test report \#(\d+) of length (\d+) added./) {
print ".";
}
if (/MSC test case is saved in file ’\.\\$tc_dir\\(.+)’./) {
$tc_names[$no_tc]=$1;
$no_tc++;
}
if (/States: \d*/) {
$g_res=$_;
}
}
print "\n";
close(LSV)
or die "Could not close ".$ls.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
$gtime=time()-$gtime;
if ($tc_names[0] =~ /$tc_pref_Tree_(\d+).mpr/) {
$first_tc=$1;
}
if ($tc_names[$no_tc-1] =~ /$tc_pref_Tree_(\d+).mpr/) {
$last_tc=$1;
}
# Filtering out err messages, fault input and input after err
# Converting test cases so right side will be able to read them
print "Filtering and converting test cases";
foreach $name (@tc_names) {
$has_err = 0;
if ($name =~ /$tc_pref_$o_pref_(\d+).mpr/) {
$tc_name = $tc_pref."_".$o_pref."_".$1;
}
$new_name = $name;
$new_name =~ s/$o_pref/$n_pref/;
open(TCI, ".\\".$tc_dir."\\".$name)
or die "Could not open file ".$name.": ".$!;
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$no_lines=0;
while (<TCI>) {
if (/.*$err.*/) {
if (!$has_err) {
$has_err = 1;
$no_lines-=2;
}
}
elsif (!($has_err && (/.*: out .* to $ls/ or /$ls : in .*/))) {
s/$ls/$rs/g;
$lines[$no_lines]=$_;
$no_lines++;
}
}
close(TCI)
or die "Could not close file ".$name.": ".$!;
open(TCO, ">.\\".$tc_dir."\\".$new_name)
or die "Could not open file ".$new_name.": ".$!;
for ($i=0; $i<$no_lines; $i++) {
print TCO $lines[$i];
}
close(TCO)
or die "Could not close file ".$new_name.": ".$!;
print ".";
}
print "\n";
# Make command file for test case execution
print "Making command file for test case execution: ’".$test_coms."’\n";
open(TCT, ">".$test_coms)
or die "Could not open file ".$test_coms.": ".$!;
print TCT "# Command file for test case execution\n\n";
print TCG "Define-Symbol-Time Undefined\n";
foreach $name (@tc_names) {
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if ($name =~ /$tc_pref_$o_pref_(\d+).mpr/) {
$tc_name = $tc_pref."_".$o_pref."_".$1;
}
$name =~ s/$o_pref/$n_pref/;
print TCT "Define-Root original\n";
print TCT "Verify-MSC .\\".$tc_dir."\\".$name."\n";
}
print TCT "Exit no";
close(TCT)
or die "Could not close file ".$test_coms.": ".$!;
# Launch right side validator and execute command
# for test case execution
print "Executing test cases";
$time=time();
open(RSV, "starter.exe ".$test_coms."|".$rs.$vl_postfix."|")
or die "Could not launch ".$ls.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
while (<RSV>) {
# Analyse test case execution
if (/MSC (.+) loaded./) {
$name=$1;
print ".";
}
if (/Symbol coverage :\s+(.+)/) {
$test_coverage=$1;
}
if (/\*\* MSC $name verified \*\*/) {
$tc_exec_res{$name}="YES";
$no_ver++;
}
if (/\*\* MSC $name NOT VERIFIED \*\*/) {
$tc_exec_res{$name}="NO";
$no_not++;
}
}
print "\n";
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close(RSV)
or die "Could not close ".$rs.$vl_postfix.": ".$!;
$time=time()-$time;
# Print report
print "\nRESULT\n\n";
print $no_tc." test cases was generated and placed in ’.\\".$tc_dir."\\’\n";
print "First: ".$tc_pref."_Tree_".$first_tc."\n";
print "Last: ".$tc_pref."_Tree_".$last_tc."\n\n";
if ($g_res ne "") {
print "".$g_res."\n";
}
else {
$mins=int($gtime/60);
$gtime = $gtime - $mins*60;
print " Time used: ".$mins.":".$gtime."\n\n";
}
print "".($no_ver+$no_not)." test cases was executed:\n";
print " Symbol coverage was ".$test_coverage."%\n";
print " ".$no_ver." was verified\n";
print " ".$no_not." was NOT verified\n\n";
$mins = int($time/60);
$time = $time - $mins*60;
print " Execution time: ".$mins.":".$time."\n\n";
foreach $name (sort keys(%tc_exec_res)) {
print $name." : ".$tc_exec_res{$name}."\n";
}
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A.4 Starter
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (argc >= 2) {
printf("Include-File %s\n",argv[1]);
printf("\n");
}
return 0;
}
A.5 Command File, Test Case Generation
# Command file for test case generation
Define-Symbol-Time Undefined
Define-MSC-Test-Case-Directory .\test_cases
Tree-Walk 10 100
Save-Reports-As-MSC-Test-Cases TreeWalk TC
Exit no
A.6 Command File, Test Case Execution
# Command file for test case execution
Define-Root original
Verify-MSC .\test_cases\TC_Conv_00013.mpr
Define-Root original
Verify-MSC .\test_cases\TC_Conv_00014.mpr
Define-Root original
Verify-MSC .\test_cases\TC_Conv_00015.mpr
Define-Root original
Verify-MSC .\test_cases\TC_Conv_00016.mpr
Exit no
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Appendix B
Example
In this appendix the full example decomposition number 8 is presented.
system Spec 1(1)
SIGNAL m0,m1;
SIGNALLIST m=m0,m1;
AG
i
(m)
o
(m)
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block AG 1(1)
SIGNAL init;
CoA SwGi
i
(m)
opp
(m),init
op
(m)
o
ip
(m)
o
(m)
process CoA 1(1)
s0
m0
m0 VIA ip
s1
*
chaos
s1
m1
m1 VIA ip
s0
*
chaos
init VIA opp
s0
chaos
NONE
ANY
m0 VIA opp
chaos
m1 VIA opp
chaos chaos
*
chaos
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process G 1(1)
s0
m0
m1 VIA o
s0
m1 
m0 VIA o
s0
process Sw 1(1)
DCL A PID;
s0
init
A:=SENDER
s1
s1
m0 
m0 VIA op
A=SENDER
s1 s2
m1 
m1 VIA op
A=SENDER
s1 s2
s2
m0
A=SENDER
m0 VIA op
s2 s2
m1
A=SENDER
m1 VIA op
s2 s2
FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE
TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE
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system refSpec 1(1)
SIGNAL m0,m1;
SIGNALLIST m=m0,m1;
SIGNAL n0,n1;
SIGNALLIST n=n0,n1;
AG1
AG2
i
(m)
o
(m)
l1
(n)
l2
(n)
block AG1 1(1)
/* [A]==TRUE */
/* chaos and switch unnecessary */
CoA1 G1i
i
(m)
ip
(m),
(n)
o
(m)
o
l1
(n)
l1l2
l2
(n)
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process CoA1 1(1)
s0
m0
m0 VIA ip
s0
m1
m1 VIA ip
s0
n0
n0 VIA ip
s0
n1
n1 VIA ip
s0
process G1 1(1)
s0
m0
n0 VIA l1
s0
m1
n1 VIA l1
s0
n0
m0 VIA o
s0
n1 
m1 VIA o
s0
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block AG2 1(1)
/* [A2]==TRUE */
/* chaos and switch unnecessary */
CoA2 G2
l1
l1
(n)
ip
(n)
l2
(n)
l2
process CoA2 1(1)
s0
n0
n0 VIA ip
s0
n1
n1 VIA ip
s0
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process G2 1(1)
s0
n0
n1 VIA l2
s0
n1
n0 VIA l2
s0
system LS1 1(1)
SIGNAL m0,m1;
SIGNALLIST m=m0,m1;
SIGNAL err;
SIGNAL n0,n1;
SIGNALLIST n=n0,n1;
LS1b
i
(m)
o
(m),err
l2
(n)
l1
(n)
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block LS1b 1(1)
A_ls1 G1_ls1
dbl1
G2_ls1
dbl2
i
i
(m)
op
(m),err
o
ip
(m)
o
l1
(n)
l1o
(n)
l1
l1p
(n)
l2
(n)
l2p
(n)
l2o
(n)
l2
process A_ls1 1(1)
s0
m0
m0 VIA ip
s1
*
err VIA op
fault
s1
m1
m1 VIA ip
s0
*
err VIA op
fault
fault
*
fault
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process G1_ls1 1(1)
s0
m0
n0 VIA l1
s0
m1
n1 VIA l1
s0
n0
m0 VIA o
s0
n1 
m1 VIA o
s0
process G2_ls1 1(1)
s0
n0
n1 VIA l2
s0
n1
n0 VIA l2
s0
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process dbl1 1(1)
idle
n0
n0 VIA l1p
n0 VIA l1o
idle
n1
n1 VIA l1p
n1 VIA l1o
idle
process dbl2 1(1)
idle
n0
n0 VIA l2p
n0 VIA l2o
idle
n1
n1 VIA l2p
n1 VIA l2o
idle
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system RS1a1 1(1)
SIGNAL m0,m1;
SIGNALLIST m=m0,m1;
SIGNAL n0,n1;
SIGNALLIST n=n0,n1;
RS1a1b
o
(m)
i
(m)
l2
(n)
l1
(n)
block RS1a1b 1(1)
A1_rs1
o
o
(m)
ip
(m)
i
l2p
(n)
l2l1
l1
(n)
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process A1_rs1 1(1)
s0
NONE
ANY
m0 VIA ip
s0
m1 VIA ip
s0
n0 VIA l2p
s0
n1 VIA l2p
s0 s0
*
s0
system RS1a2 1(1)
SIGNAL n0,n1;
SIGNALLIST n=n0,n1;
RS1a2b
l2
(n)
l1
(n)
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block RS1a2b 1(1)
A2_rs1l2
l2
(n)
ip
(n)
l1
process A2_rs1 1(1)
s0
NONE
ANY
n0 VIA ip
s0
n1 VIA ip
s0 s0
*
s0
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system LS2 1(1)
SIGNAL m0,m1;
SIGNALLIST m=m0,m1;
SIGNAL err;
LS2b
i
(m)
o
(m),err
block LS2b 1(1)
SIGNAL n0,n1;
SIGNALLIST n=n0,n1;
A_ls2 G1_ls2
G2_ls2
i
i
(m)
op
(m),err
o
ip
(m)
o
l1
(n)
l2
(n)
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process A_ls2 1(1)
s0
m0
m0 VIA ip
s1
*
err VIA op
fault
s1
m1
m1 VIA ip
s0
*
err VIA op
fault
fault
*
fault
process G1_ls2 1(1)
s0
m0
n0 VIA l1
s0
m1
n1 VIA l1
s0
n0
m0 VIA o
s0
n1 
m1 VIA o
s0
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process G2_ls2 1(1)
s0
n0
n1 VIA l2
s0
n1
n0 VIA l2
s0
system RS2 1(1)
SIGNAL m0,m1;
SIGNALLIST m=m0,m1;
RS2b
i
(m)
o
(m)
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block RS2b 1(1)
G_rs2i
i
(m)
o
(m)
o
process G_rs2 1(1)
s0
m0
m1 VIA o
s0
m1 
m0 VIA o
s0
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Appendix C
Test Results
This appendix contains raw results from testing of the tools. Table C.1
provides the number of states in the examples as a measure of size. Tables
C.2-C.4 present the results from the tests, and tables C.5 and C.6 show the
number of messages in the generated test cases, as a measure of length.
Numer of State
Ex. 1 2y 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
A 1 2 4 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1
G 1 3 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1
A1 1 2 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
G1 2 2 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1
A2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1
G2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 2 1
Sum 7 15 20 10 8 6 6 7 8 14 6 7 9 9 7
y Decomposition has three components, but component 2 and 3 are identical.
Table C.1: Size of examples by number of states
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Ex 1 Ex 2y Ex 3 Ex 4 Ex 5
D
ir
ec
t gen
test
no
cov
6:47
0:38
10
95,24
6:26
0:07
15
70.00
10:00
1:37
14
96,08
10:00
0:08
10
97,62
0:00
0:04
4
100,00
A
L
1.
1 gen
test
no
cov
0:00
0:02
2
100.00
0:01
0:05
6
100.00
0:05
0:05
5
100.00
0:01
0:04
2
100.00
0:01
0:04
4
100.00
A
L
1.
2 gen
test
no
cov
0:01
0:04
1
100.00
0:01
0:05
6
100.00
0:04
0:05
4
100.00
0:00
0:05
3
100.00
0:01
0:05
4
100.00
A
L
2
gen
test
no
cov
0:01
0:04
2
100.00
0:01
0:05
6
100.00
0:05
0:05
5
90.91
0:01
0:04
4
100.00
0:01
0:04
4
100.00
D val Y Y Y N Y
AL val Y Y Y N,1 Y
group 1 1 1 1 5 2
group 2 1 1 1 1 3
Table C.2: Results from testing examples 1-5
y Decomposition has three components, but components 2 and 3 are identical.
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Ex 6 Ex 7 Ex 8 Ex 9 Ex 10
D
ir
ec
t gen
test
no
cov
0:05
0:04
3
83.36
0:04
0:04
3
100.00
0:00
0:04
2
61.82
0:00
0:04
2
61.82
6:22
0:44
10
88.73
A
L
1.
1 gen
test
no
cov
0:03
0:05
3
100.00
0:03
0:05
3
100.00
0:01
0:04
2
100.00
0:00
0:04
2
100.00
0:00
0:04
2
100.00
A
L
1.
2 gen
test
no
cov
0:03
0:03
3
100.00
0:03
0:04
3
100.00
0:01
0:04
2
100.00
0:01
0:04
2
100.00
0:01
0:03
1
100.00
A
L
2
gen
test
no
cov
0:04
0:03
3
100.00
0:03
0:04
3
100.00
0:00
0:03
2
100.00
0:00
0:04
2
62.50
0:00
0:03
2
100.00
D val Y N Y N N
AL val Y N,2 Y N,2 N,2
group 1 2 4 3 6 4
group 2 3 3 2 2 1
Table C.3: Results from testing examples 6-10
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Ex 11y Ex 12z Ex 13z Ex 14 Ex 15
D
ir
ec
t gen
test
no
cov
0:34
0:04
4
100.00
0:18
0:04
1
43.75
0:12
0:03
1
43,75
0:41
0:07
5
96.36
6:50
0:07
10
100.00
A
L
1.
1 gen
test
no
cov
0:35
0:08
5
100.00
2:01
0:31
5
100.00
0:13
0:06
1
100.00
0:00
0:04
2
100.00
0:00
0:04
2
100.00
A
L
1.
2 gen
test
no
cov
2:01
0:13
5
100.00
0:12
0:05
1
100.00
0:00
0:04
2
100.00
0:00
0:04
2
100.00
A
L
2
gen
test
no
cov
0:35
0:05
4
100.00
0:18
0:04
1
45.45
0:12
0:04
1
45.45
0:00
0:04
2
100.00
0:00
0:04
2
100.00
D val N Y Y Y N
AL val N,2 Y Y Y N,1
group 1 4 1 2 1 5
group 2 3 3 3 1 1
Table C.4: Results from testing examples 11-15
y The assumption of component 2 in the decomposition was not tested be-
cause the component has no input channels.
z The low symbol coverage is probably because of an endless loop of message
passing between the components in the decomposition that dominated input
of messages from the environment.
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Explanation of Tables C.2-C.4
Direct: testing with Direct testing tool
AL 1.x: testing permiss AL 1.x of the Abadi/Lamport testing tool
AL 2: testing of premiss AL 2 of the Abadi/Lamport testing tool
gen: time used for generating test cases, minutes and seconds
test: time used for executing test cases, minutes and seconds
no: number of test cases (empty test cases not counted)
cov: symbol coverage when executing test cases, percentage
D val: validation with Direct testing tool
Y validated
N not validated
AL val: validation with Abadi/Lamport testing tool
Y validated
N,1 not validated by premiss AL 1.x
N,2 not validated by premiss AL 2
group 1: Grouping 1 (section 8.2)
group 2: Grouping 2 (section 8.2)
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Number of messages in test cases
E
x
1
Direct 2, 3, 83, 84, 84, 86, 164, 164, 167, 167
AL 1.1 0, 2, 6
AL 1.2 0, 0, 2
AL 2 0, 2, 3
E
x
2
Direct 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3
AL 1.1 0, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5
AL 1.2 0, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4
AL 1.3 0, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4
AL 2 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3
E
x
3
Direct 2, 3, 4, 5, 86, 86, 167, 168, 168, 170, 170, 170, 244, 249
AL 1.1 4, 4, 5, 7, 8
AL 1.2 0, 2, 2, 3, 3
AL 2 2, 3, 3, 4, 5
E
x
4
Direct 3, 81, 82, 82, 83, 83, 83, 83, 84, 84
AL 1.1 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 3
AL 1.2 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3
AL 2 0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 4
E
x
5
Direct 2, 2, 4, 4
AL 1.1 2, 2, 4, 4
AL 1.2 2, 2, 4, 4
AL 2 2, 2, 4, 4
E
x
6
Direct 1, 2, 2
AL 1.1 3, 4, 4
AL 1.2 2, 2, 3
AL 2 1, 2, 2
E
x
7
Direct 2, 2, 2
AL 1.1 4, 4, 4
AL 1.2 2, 2, 2
AL 2 2, 2, 2
E
x
8
Direct 2, 2
AL 1.1 0, 4, 8
AL 1.2 0, 1, 4
AL 2 0, 2, 4
Table C.5: Length of test cases by number of messages
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Number of messages in test cases
E
x
9
Direct 2, 4
AL 1.1 0, 2, 4
AL 1.2 0, 1, 4
AL 2 0, 2, 4
E
x
10
Direct 9, 84, 84, 85, 85, 165, 165, 166, 168, 168
AL 1.1 0, 1, 15
AL 1.2 0, 0, 6
AL 2 0, 1, 9
E
x
11
Direct 0, 2, 2, 2, 2
AL 1.1 82, 84, 84, 85, 85
AL 1.2 82, 82, 82, 83, 83
AL 2 0, 2, 2, 2, 2
E
x
12
Direct 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
AL 1.1 69, 99, 198, 199, 199
AL 1.2 98, 98, 198, 198, 198
AL 2 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
E
x
13
Direct 20
AL 1.1 143
AL 1.2 123
AL 2 41
E
x
14
Direct 4, 50, 50, 51, 52
AL 1.1 0, 2, 4
AL 1.2 0, 1, 4
AL 2 0, 2, 4
E
x
15
Direct 4, 83, 83, 84 ,85, 164, 164, 165, 165, 167
AL 1.1 4, 4
AL 1.2 2, 2
AL 2 2, 2
Table C.6: Length of test cases by number of messages
